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[1043] 
The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism 
in an Age of National Political Parties 
David Schleicher∗
Despite it being the constitutional amendment that most directly altered the structure of 
the federal government, little is known about how and why the Seventeenth Amendment 
was enacted. Existing scholarship on why the Constitution was amended to require direct 
elections for U.S. Senators, rather than having them appointed by state legislatures, has 
troubled accounting for two major puzzles. Why were state legislatures eager to give away 
the power to choose Senators? And why was there virtually no discussion of federalism 
during debates over removing a key constitutional protection for states governments? 
 
 
This Article offers a theory that can provide an answer to both of these questions. Support 
for direct elections was, at least in part, a result of the rise of ideologically coherent, 
national political parties. The rise of truly national parties meant that state legislative 
elections increasingly turned on national issues, as voters used these elections as means to 
select Senators. State politicians and interest groups supported direct elections as a way of 
separating national and state politics. Advocates of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment 
claim the mantle of federalism, but repeal would reduce the benefits of federalism, 
making state legislatures into something akin to electoral colleges for U.S. Senators. 
 
While important in its own right, the history of the Seventeenth Amendment can also 
teach us a great deal about how federalism functions in eras of strong national political 
parties. First, national political parties have not generally served as “political safeguards 
of federalism,” but instead have made state politics turn on national issues. Second, 
despite the Seventeenth Amendment, state elections still largely turn on national politics. 
Although state issues are sometimes important, the most important factor in state 
legislative elections is the popularity of the President. To achieve the benefits for state 
democracy sought by supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment, election law reform 
would be more effective than structural constitutional changes.  
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Fontana, Heather Gerken, Michael Gilbert, Bruce Johnsen, and Todd Zywicki and participants at 
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Introduction 
For a brief moment in 2010, the Seventeenth Amendment suddenly 
and surprisingly became news. Before the Seventeenth Amendment gave 
each state’s citizens the power to directly elect U.S. senators, state 
legislatures had the power to appoint them.1 After years of being a niche 
cause for a few legal scholars and fringe political activists,2
 
 1. The Constitution originally read: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have 
one Vote.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment changed this 
provision to read: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors 
in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
State legislatures.” U.S. Const. amend. XVII. 
 repealing the 
 2. The leading scholars pushing repeal were (now Judge) Jay Bybee, C.H. Hoebeke, and Todd 
Zywicki. See, e.g., C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the 
Seventeenth Amendment (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the 
Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500 (1997); Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond 
the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for 
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Seventeenth Amendment became popular among Tea Party figures and 
Republican candidates for office.3 Prominent conservative figures like 
Texas Governor Rick Perry, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and 
columnist George Will came out in favor of repeal.4
And then it went cold, with attention dying down and no legislative 
action,
 The movement to 
repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, once well outside of the popular 
mainstream, was hot. 
5 despite several proponents of repeal getting elected to Congress.6 
But this upsurge in attention to the Seventeenth Amendment—and the 
continuing support for repeal in Congress and beyond—raises one of the 
great, unanswered questions in constitutional history: Why did we take 
away from state legislatures the power to select senators, which James 
Madison described in The Federalist No. 62 as so “congenial with the 
public opinion” that it was “unnecessary to dilate?”7
The academic literature has struggled with this question, pointing to 
explanations that are, at best, incomplete or too weak to explain the 
passage of an constitutional amendment. Most problematically, existing 
theories explain little about the central puzzle in the historical record: state 
 
 
Current Reform Proposals, 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165 (1997) [hereinafter Zywicki, Beyond the Shell]; 
Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, 73 Or. L. Rev. 1007 (1994) [hereinafter Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests]. For a 
discussion of support for repeal among political activists, see Kevin Drum, Repeal the 17th 
Amendment!, Mother Jones (Aug. 15, 2011, 5:17 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/ 
2011/08/repeal-17th-amendment (discussing long-term support for repeal in John Birch Society and 
others on the “fringe of movement conservatism”). 
 3. See Alex Seitz-Wald, Repeal the 17th Amendment! The Surprising Republican Movement to 
Strip Voters of Their Right to Elect Senators, Salon (Aug. 16, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.salon.com/ 
2012/08/16/repeal_the_17th_amendment (noting support among Tea Party activists, leading figures 
like Justice Scalia and Gov. Perry, and candidates for office); George F. Will, Editorial, Sen. Feingold’s 
Constitution, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 2009, at A19 (supporting repeal). 
 4. See Seitz-Wald, supra note 3. It even became a campaign issue, with several Democrats running 
ads criticizing Republican candidates for supporting repeal. See Greg Sargent, Can Dems Use Tea Party 
Against GOP on 17th Amendment?, Wash. Post: Plum Line (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:46 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2010/09/can_vulnerable_dems_teabag_gop.html (describing 
Democratic attack ads based on Republican candidate’s support for repeal); Will, supra note 3. 
 5. Dying down, but not dead. For instance, Mark Levin’s book The Liberty Amendments, calling 
for repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, was a New York Times number one best seller in 2013. 
Best Sellers: Combined Print & E-Book Nonfiction, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2013, at 24 (book review); 
Mark R. Levin, The Liberty Amendments: Restoring the American Republic (2013). Senator Ted 
Cruz criticized the Seventeenth Amendment in a tweet in 2012. Ted Cruz, Twitter (Jan. 12, 2012, 
6:06 PM), https://twitter.com/tedcruz/status/157644774369792000 (“17th Amendment was one of the 
structural changes pushed by progressives that pushed power to Washington and weakened the States.”). 
 6. In 2010, the most notable supporter elected was Senator Michael Lee. Support for repeal was 
still alive in campaigns in 2012, when it was endorsed by at least four Republican candidates for Senate—
Todd Akin, Jeff Flake, Peter Hoekstra, and Richard Mourdock. See Seitz-Wald, supra note 3 (noting 
support from Akin, Mourdock, Flake, and Hoekstra, and support among several elected officials 
including Senator Lee). Among these repeal supporters, only Flake was elected. See Ken Belson et al., 
Northeast, South, Midwest, West, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2012, at A16 (discussing election results). 
 7. The Federalist No. 62, at 377 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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legislators, state-based interest groups, and political figures committed to 
states’ rights in other contexts did little to contest a constitutional 
amendment that removed a substantial power from state legislatures.8 In 
fact, the direct election of U.S. senators was wildly popular among state 
legislators, the very people it disempowered.9 Thirty-one state legislatures 
passed resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment providing for 
direct elections, and many passed resolutions calling for a constitutional 
convention if an amendment was not enacted.10 In a number of states, a 
form of direct elections had already been implemented before the passage 
of the Seventeenth Amendment through a clever ballot rule known as the 
“Oregon system.”11 Further, the debates over the Seventeenth 
Amendment in Congress included minimal discussion of any potential 
negative implications for federalism despite it removing a substantial 
power from state officials.12 As Alan Grimes notes, no amendment has so 
“fundamentally altered the design of the original structure of the 
government,” but scholars have still yet to answer even the most basic 
questions about the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.13
This Article argues that contemporary Seventeenth Amendment 
scholarship has ignored a major change in American political life 
concurrent with the movement supporting direct elections for U.S. 
senators: the rise of truly national political parties. The combination of 
having state legislatures appoint senators and the increasing 
nationalization and ideological coherence of the major parties at the turn 
of the last century ensured that state legislative elections were 
fundamentally about national politics. Voters used state legislative 
elections to choose senators rather than hold state legislators accountable 
for their performance in office. The movement for direct elections of 
senators was driven in part by a perceived need—by state politicians, 
voters, and interest groups powerful in state politics—to save elections at 
the state level from becoming mere proxies for national political conflict.
 
14
This Article offers both a theoretical argument for why changes in the 
party system likely had this effect and historical evidence that shows that 
at least some supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment saw the direct 
election of senators as a method of preserving state democracy. The fear 
that state democracy was under threat was not the only reason the 
 
 
 8. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (showing high levels of support for the 
Seventeenth Amendment in state legislatures). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 12. There was a substantial debate over state rights and the Seventeenth Amendment, but it was 
not about direct election of senators. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. It was instead about 
whether the Seventeenth Amendment should include a change to the Elections Clause of Article I. Id. 
 13. Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 2 (1978). 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
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Seventeenth Amendment passed, but it was an important factor in 
explaining this substantial constitutional change (and one largely ignored 
in today’s debates over repeal). 
Although the history of the Seventeenth Amendment is interesting 
in its own right, it is particularly important because it can teach us a great 
deal about how federalism works today, as our political parties are now 
more ideologically coherent, national in form, and polarized than ever 
before.15 While there is an enormous literature debating the benefits and 
costs of federalism, most legal scholarship and judicial opinions in the 
field are premised on a belief that increasing the autonomy of state 
policymaking power provides a set of benefits, from allowing citizens “to 
vote with their feet” by moving between states with different policies to 
promote “laboratories of democracy” to giving power to governments 
that are more responsive to popular opinion.16 These benefits can then be 
balanced against the benefits of national resolution of certain issues. But 
virtually all the normative justifications for “Our Federalism”17
Modern proponents of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment 
claim the mantle of federalism, but they have the case almost entirely 
backwards. Rather than serving to enhance the values of federalism, 
repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would ensure that state 
legislative elections turned on the popularity of U.S. senators. This is 
only “pro-federalism” if one’s view of federalism is purely formal, a 
counting up of official powers and responsibilities. To the extent that one 
cares about the benefits that flow from having a federal system, repealing 
the Seventeenth Amendment would be harmful. 
—varied 
though they are—turn on the ability of state citizens to use elections to 
express preferences about state policies and hold state officials 
accountable. To the extent that a constitutional or legislative change 
makes it harder for state residents to use the apparatus of their state 
government to achieve policy ends, it should be considered a move away 
from realizing the benefits of federalism. That is, leaving certain powers 
to states can reduce the benefits of federalism. The original Constitution’s 
delegation of the power to choose U.S. senators was a substantial power 
held by state legislatures. However, as a result of the increasing 
nationalization of political parties at the turn of the last century, having 
state legislatures make these appointments reduced the capacity of state 
elections to serve as a tool for voters to judge the performance of state 
officials. The change to direct elections of senators was thus a move 
toward achieving the normative benefits that we associate with federalism. 
 
 15. See infra notes 207–211 and accompanying text. 
 16. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory.”). 
 17. The term “Our Federalism” was coined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
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However, the pro-federalism story of the Seventeenth Amendment 
has an ironic end. Even after the Seventeenth Amendment, voters in 
state legislative elections continue to respond mostly to national rather 
than state inputs, leaving state legislatures largely unaccountable and 
unrepresentative. While repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would 
make this worse, the single most important factor in determining which 
party wins state legislative elections today is the popularity of the 
President.18
This is largely a function of the fact that the parties on the ballot—
Democrats and Republicans—are national in scope. The national parties 
face legal and practical hurdles in their efforts to create differentiated state 
party brands that state voters understand as as distinct from their national 
parents. They are, as I have argued in previous work, “mismatched” to the 
level of government, leaving voters without informative party labels to 
help them overcome their lack of knowledge about individual legislative 
candidates.
 The vast majority of voters who favor President Obama, for 
example, are likely to vote for Democrats in state legislatures with little 
attention paid to the actual performance of incumbent state legislators or 
the position taken by their challengers. 
19 While candidates for governor or mayor are sufficiently high 
profile that they sometimes create their own brand in the eyes of voters 
and win races in states and localities in which their party traditionally 
does not succeed, state legislative parties cannot do the same.20
The failures of party democracy at the state level are an important 
limitation on the functioning of American federalism. Contrary to Larry 
Kramer’s well-known claim, rather than serving as “political safeguards 
of federalism,” interaction between state and national political parties 





 18. See Steven Rogers, Accountability in a Federal System: How Parties Perform in Office and 
State Legislative Elections 22–24 (2012) (unpublished Job Market paper), available at 
http://www.thebrokenwindow.net/papers/R/Rogers-JobMarketPaper-Web.pdf. 
 To achieve the pro-federalism ends of the 
 19. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, 
Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (2013) (analyzing mismatch); David 
Schleicher, What if Europe Held an Election and No One Cared?, 52 Harv. Int’l L.J. 109 (2011) 
[hereinafter Schleicher, What if Europe] (discussing mismatch in European Parliament elections); 
David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of 
Election Law, 23 J.L. & Pol. 419 (2007) [hereinafter Schleicher, City Council Elections] (arguing that 
there are mismatch problems in city council elections). 
 20. See, e.g., Jill Colvin, The Tall Man Cometh: Bill de Blasio Will Bring His Own Brand of 
Leadership to City Hall, Politicker (Oct. 29, 2013, 8:42 PM), http://politicker.com/2013/10/the-tall-
man-cometh-bill-de-blasio-will-bring-his-own-brand-of-leadership-to-city-hall (discussing New York 
City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s approach to campaigning). 
 21. The two central figures in developing the theory (or rather theories) of the “political 
safeguards of federalism” are Larry Kramer and Herbert Wechsler. See Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1523–24 (1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding Federalism] 
(arguing that state-based political parties and the ability of states to interact with federal 
administrators protects federalism); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
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Seventeenth Amendment, reformers would need to come up with 
methods for making state policies more visible to state voters when they 
enter the voting booth. Changes to election laws are more likely than 
constitutional amendments to increase the degree to which state elections 
turn on the performance and policy positions of state officials and 
candidates. 
As voluminous as it is, contemporary scholarly and public debates 
about federalism rarely focus on how well state democracy actually 
works. The history of the Seventeenth Amendment shows that this was 
not always the case. But today’s scholars, jurists, and politicians generally 
focus on the powers of states and their independence from federal 
encroachment (and in particular on the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
these questions), or alternatively on cooperation between state and 
federal officials in administering jointly-run programs, but ignore larger 
questions about the success or failure of popular representation at the 
state level. Furthermore, state democracy is not healthy, as it fails to 
produce policy outcomes that are representative of popular preferences. 
For example, a leading study shows that, at the state level, “[r]oughly 
half the time, opinion majorities lose—even large supermajorities prevail 
less than 60% of the time. In other words, state governments are on 
average no more effective in translating opinion majorities into public 
policy than a simple coin flip.”22
 Part I of this Article analyzes the history of state legislative 
appointment of senators from the founding period to the enactment of the 
Seventeenth Amendment. Part II argues that changes in the centralization 
and ideological coherence of national political parties can help explain why 
there was little state-government-based opposition to the Seventeenth 
Amendment. Part III argues that the history of the Seventeenth 
Amendment has important implications for the literature on the political 
safeguards of federalism and on the study of federalism generally. 
 The problems of state democracy raise 
important questions about existing theories of federalism, such as: How 
many inventions do our “laboratories of democracy” actually create? 
How many different policy options do the fifty states provide to mobile 
residents? Our understanding of these theories would be well served by 
looking beyond the arguments at One First Street and into the elections 
that choose the people who run state governments in Albany and 
Richmond, in Columbus and Sacramento. 
 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 269 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back] (same); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 546, 558–59 (1954) 
(arguing that the structure of the federal government protects federalism). 
 22. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 Am. J. Pol. 
Sci. 148, 149 (2012). 
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I.  Appointing Versus Electing Senators from the Founding 
Period to the Seventeenth Amendment 
This Part explores the history of arguments over methods of 
appointment for senators from the founding period through passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment. As it will show, the existing literature has had 
difficulty explaining the rise of support for directly electing U.S. senators. 
A. The Founders and Senatorial Appointment 
The Citizens of the States would be represented both individually and 
collectively. 
—James Madison23
In order to understand what was missing from the debates over the 
Seventeenth Amendment, it is necessary to understand why the original 
Constitution gave state legislatures the power to appoint U.S. senators. 
In The Federalist No. 62, James Madison stated two reasons for giving 
state legislatures the power to appoint senators: 
 
Among the various modes which might have been devised for 
constituting this branch of the government . . . . [i]t is recommended by 
the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to 
the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal 
government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form 
a convenient link between the two systems.24
State legislatures were thus given the power to appoint senators for two 
reasons: to ensure “select” representation, and to protect the interests of 
the states. The former can be seen in many aspects of the design of the 
Senate, particularly its six-year terms.
 
25 The Founders justified their 
decision to give state legislatures the power to choose senators in part to 
remove the decision from mass democratic consideration and put the 
decision in elite hands.26
 It is a mistake, however, to look at state legislative selection only as 
a means of insulating government from popular opinion. After all, the 
Constitutional Convention considered and rejected other possible ways 
of selecting the Senate that were equally removed from the popular vote, 




 23. James Madison, Debates of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 163 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 1845). 
 The 
other side of the “double advantage” was also central to the decision. 
George Mason defended state legislative selection on the ground that 
 24. The Federalist No. 62, supra note 7, at 377. 
 25. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 180–82. 
 26. The Federalist No. 62, supra note 7, at 377. 
 27. Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, 
and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671, 674 (1999) (noting that the Convention 
considered and rejected a resolution proposing that the members of the House select the Senate). 
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states needed the power of self-defense against the federal government.28
But senators were not intended to serve as ambassadors of state 
governments either. The Convention rejected proposals that would have 
given state governments control over senators, including the power to 
recall senators or punish them for ignoring the instructions of state 
legislatures.
 
The Senate was clearly seen as the protector of state interests. 
29 Senators from the same state were allowed to disagree, 
which is inconsistent with the idea that they served as agents of state 
governments. Further, the Constitution did not allow state governments 
as sovereign entities to decide how they would select senators; the power 
to appoint was explicitly delegated to state legislatures, who were seen as 
the bodies with the greatest democratic pedigree.30
Thus, State legislative selection of senators was not only a method 
of protecting states as entities; it was also a way to increase the types of 
representation afforded by the federal government to the people.
 
31 
William Pierce, a delegate from Georgia, made this point at the 
Convention when he said that the division of bicameral legislature into 
national and federal bodies meant that “the Citizens of the States would 
be represented both individually and collectively.”32 Bicameralism based 
on different sources of electoral accountability would also protect against 
dominance by one faction.33
These benefits were crucial in public justifications of senatorial 
appointment. In Federalist No. 39, Madison emphasized that both houses 
of Congress had democratic purchase, but of different sorts. He noted that 
the “House of Representatives . . . is elected immediately by the great 





 28. George H. Haynes, American Public Problems: The Election of Senators 13 (Ralph 
Curtis. Ringwalt, ed., 1906) (quoting George Mason’s arguments for the popular election of senators). 
 Thus, both have democratic pedigree, if of a different sort. 
Then, he continued: 
 29. See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1508. 
 30. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). 
 31. This understanding of the decision to have state legislatures select Senators clears up one 
seeming contradiction in the Framer’s beliefs about the Senate. See Kramer, supra note 29, at 1508 
(“The Senate was designed to serve contradictory ends. On the one hand, it was supposed to protect 
states by giving state legislatures an effective veto over federal policy. On the other hand, it was also 
supposed to serve as a republican analogue to the aristocratic House of Lords by taking the longer, 
more ‘national’ view of policy.”). However, if one considers the Senate as providing a different form of 
representation, one in which through deliberation they came to the best interests of the nation as a 
compact between states, this seeming contradiction dissolves. That is, to the extent this understanding 
was common, there is no reason to think that representing state interests in a national legislature and 
having a long-sighted view of the national interest beyond day-to-day politics are in conflict. 
 32. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 177 (quoting Georgia Delegate Pierce’s 
statement during the debates); see also Madison, Debates, supra note 23, at 163. 
 33. Id. at 175–79. 
 34. The Federalist No. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of 
America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, 
and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular 
State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The 
Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as 
political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the 
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing 
Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. . . . 
From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed 
character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL 
features.35
When combined with his earlier statement noting the democratic 
nature of both bodies, the meaning of Madison’s argument becomes 
clear. Giving elected state legislatures the power to appoint senators and 
voters the power to select members of the House directly meant that the 
two houses of Congress would provide two different types of democratic 
representation: individual (as national citizens) in the House and 
collective (as citizens of a State) in the Senate. 
 
In an important article, Terry Smith challenged the argument that 
state legislatures were intentionally given the power to select senators to 
give states control over the Senate.36 Instead, Smith argues, it was the 
result of the intersection of two other debates: the Great Compromise, 
which gave small states equal representation in the Senate, and differences 
about the value of elite versus popular representation.37 In fact, there was 
widespread disgust with the idea that states as entities would be given 
representation rather than citizens, including from Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton.38 The design features of the Senate, from the ability 
of senators from the same state to vote differently to the absence of the 
power of states to recall senators, were inconsistent with the idea of a 
Senate that represented states. According to Smith, the Founders chose to 
have state legislatures select senators and later developed an explanation.39
Smith further argues that during the battles over ratification, the 
inconsistencies in the justification for state legislative election were laid 
bare.
 
40 The Federalists had to face claims by Anti-Federalists that the 
Constitution was inconsistent with state sovereignty because, by the 
understanding at the time, sovereignty was indivisible.41
 
 35. Id. at 244. 
 James Wilson, 
leading the campaign for the Constitution in Pennsylvania, instead argued 
that sovereignty “resides in the citizens,” allowing for it to be represented 
 36. Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: the Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. 
L. Rev. 1, 21–34 (1996). 
 37. Id. at 19–26. 
 38. Id. at 27. 
 39. Id. at 21–22.  
 40. Id. at 29. 
 41. Id. at 31.  
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in different forms at different levels of government.42 Acceptance of this 
argument, Smith claims, nullified any argument that the Senate was an 
expression of state sovereignty. “The legislative appointment of federal 
Senators was not a mechanism for representing state legislatures in the 
Senate, for these entities did not in reality possess sovereign powers—
only the people did.”43
Smith successfully undermines the notion that the Senate was 
intentionally designed exclusively as a means of protecting state 
sovereignty. But, as the arguments made by Madison and Wilson during 
ratification suggest,
 
44 one key proffered justification for allocating this 
power to state legislatures was providing representation to the people of 
each state in their capacity as state residents. There were no national 
political parties when the Constitution was written, and the idea of such 
parties was anathema to the Founders.45
As with any such decision, many forces surely played a role in the 
decision to allocate power to choose senators to the state legislatures. 
However, three lessons can be drawn from the history of the original 
decision to give state legislatures the power to appoint U.S. senators that 
may help explain the debate over the Seventeenth Amendment. First, 
state legislative appointment was designed to ensure elite—and not 
purely popular—representation. Second, the Framers took seriously the 
benefits of using the Senate to provide representation for states in the 
federal government. Third, the decisions to give the power to state 
legislatures instead of the state as a whole, the absence of recall power, and 
the ability of senators from the same state to vote differently meant that 
senators were not seen as ambassadors of state governments. Instead, 
senators were meant to provide representation to citizens in their capacity 
as citizens of states, rather than just as citizens of the nation. 
 Instead, each state had its own 
political culture, local leaders, press, and social organizations. Thus, 
politics internal to each state could be, and were, quite different from 
politics at the national level. State legislatures represented a state’s 
political culture. Allocating the power to appoint senators to state 
legislatures meant that there would be two types of representation for 
citizens.  
B. Where Did Support for Direct Elections Come from? 
If the Senate was designed in part to protect state governments 
against federal encroachment and in part to provide an alternative means 
of representation for voters, it is a riddle why state election of senators 
 
 42. Id. at 33.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 33–34.  
 45. See Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 269. 
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was abandoned overwhelmingly in 1913 without any real debate over the 
extent to which it would affect the role of states in the federal 
government. Traditional accounts of the history of the Seventeenth 
Amendment provide a number of explanations for its success, but none 
of them directly address the two most difficult questions about its 
passage: why direct election was so overwhelmingly popular in the state 
legislatures it disempowered and why there was so little discussion of 
how direct elections reduced state authority and power. 
Before discussing the history of the Seventeenth Amendment, it is 
important to see how the Senate functioned during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. There is some dispute about the extent to which the 
Senate ever truly provided representation to citizens collectively or 
protected the interests of state governments. William Riker and Larry 
Kramer argue that the original set-up of the Senate strongly limited the 
degree to which senators served as representatives of states.46 Once 
appointed, senators were largely independent of state legislatures 
because of their six-year terms and because state legislatures did not 
have the power of recall. Further, although state legislatures did have the 
power to “instruct” senators on specific votes, this power was restricted 
by their limited power to punish wayward senators and was phased out 
after abuse during the Jackson Administration.47 According to Riker, the 
result was that having state legislatures select senators “did not . . . have 
quite the anticipated effect. Except for a few occasions when sectionalism 
has been organized by state governments, the Senate has not been a 
peripheralizing institution.”48
Todd Zywicki, on the other hand, while acknowledging the 
limitations created by the lack of the power of recall and the atrophying 
of the instruction power, argues: 
 
Nonetheless, instruction and the remaining enforcement mechanisms 
such as refusal to reelect and forced resignations provided state 
legislatures with some measure of control over Senators. . . . 
[S]tatistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the Senate played an 
active role in preserving the sovereignty and independent sphere of 
action of state governments.49
Regardless of the emphasis one puts on this evidence, it is clear that 
the Senate was not as robust an institution in protecting state interests as 
some Framers intended. But it is also clear that it was not a purely 
 
 
 46. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1506–10; William H. Riker, The Senate 
and American Federalism, 49 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 452, 455–63 (1955). 
 47. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 224 n.33; Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1508–09. 
 48. Riker, supra note 46, at 455. 
 49. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 173–74. 
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national institution either. The question of why the original Senate was 
changed remains.  
Scholars usually date the beginning of the national movement in 
favor of direct elections to the 1870s, when advocates introduced the first 
real efforts to amend the Constitution in Congress.50 Others point to the 
rise of the “public canvass,” in which candidates for Senate, starting in 
the 1830s, would stump for state legislators, making state legislative 
elections into partial proxies for the popular support for the candidates.51 
The most famous example of the “public canvass” was the nationally 
followed Illinois Senate race of 1858, in which the state legislative election 
served as a proxy for the titanic battle between Abraham Lincoln and 
Stephen Douglas, with Democratic state legislative candidates pledging 
their support to Douglas and Republicans to Lincoln.52 After the Civil 
War, President Andrew Johnson wrote that the arguments in favor of 
direct election of senators were so overwhelming that they barely needed 
explaining.53
Regardless of the exact beginning of the movement for direct 
elections, it is clear that it picked up rapidly during the mid-1870s, when 
members of Congress regularly began to file constitutional amendments to 
institute direct elections for senators.
 
54 Additionally, many states began 
adopting primary elections for senators, in which partisans could directly 
choose the candidate of their choice.55 This, of course, did not create 
direct elections—whichever party won the state legislature would still 
have the power to choose its candidates. However, the public profile of 
Senate candidates meant that their popularity (or lack thereof) became 
increasingly important in state legislative elections.56
Around the turn of the century, state legislatures began to actively 
push for a constitutional amendment. Between 1890 and 1905, thirty-one 
of the forty-five state legislatures had passed resolutions either calling on 
Congress to pass an amendment providing for the direct election of 
senators, to hold a conference with other states to work on such an 
amendment, or to have a Constitutional Convention such that the direct 
 
 
 50. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 103 (noting that although amendments to change the form of 
senatorial appointment had been proposed in the 1820s and 1830s, the first real efforts to amend the 
Constitution to require direct election occurred in the 1870s); see also Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra 
note 2, at 174 (same). 
 51. See Riker, supra note 46, at 464. 
 52. See id. at 464–65. 
 53. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 102. 
 54. See Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments, 103 Yale L.J. 1971, 1976 (1994) (citing 1 George H. Haynes, The Senate of 
the United States: Its History and Practice 96–97 (1938)). 
 55. Id. at 1977 (describing the rise of Senate party primaries and noting, where one party was 
dominant, like the solid Democratic South, that these functioned like direct elections). 
 56. See Riker, supra note 46, at 466. 
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elections could be included in a newly drawn Constitution.57 They were 
aided by the popular press, which seized on the issue: William Randolph 
Hearst hired muckraking journalist David Graham Phillips to write a 
sensationalist exposé, “The Treason of the Senate,” which attacked the 
appointed Senate as a club of corrupt millionaires.58
States also began to implement direct elections themselves through 
a clever mechanism that became known as the “Oregon system.”
 
59 Under 
the Oregon system, state legislative candidates were required to state on 
the ballot whether they would abide by the results of a formally non-
binding direct election for U.S. senator.60 Almost all legislative candidates 
did so, fearing popular wrath if they did not, and followed the results 
once elected.61 By 1908, twenty-eight of the forty-five states used the 
Oregon system or some other form of direct elections, some adopted 
through the initiative process and others through legislative action.62
In the House of Representatives, direct election of senators was 
nearly as popular. Amendments to the Constitution providing for direct 
election passed the House in each session between 1893 and 1912.
 
63 
Hardliners in the Senate managed to fend off each of these efforts and 
were aided when the Amendment became linked with a highly 
controversial attempt by southern senators remove Congress’s ability to 
pass voting rights legislation from the Elections Clause of Article I.64 But 
in 1912, supporters of the Amendment severed the Amendment from the 
change to the Elections Clause, and the drumbeat of popular support 
ensured its passage.65
 
 57. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 108–09. 
 The fear of a Constitutional Convention, which 
could have resulted in more dramatic changes to the Constitution, the 
 58. Much later, the articles were republished in book form. See generally David Graham 
Phillips, The Treason of the Senate (George E. Mowry & Judson A. Grenier eds., 1964); see also 
Donald R. Matthews, 30 Pub. Opinion Q. 326, 326–27 (1966) (reviewing David Graham Phillips, The 
Treason of the Senate (1906)). Phillips’s attack was so prominent that President Theodore Roosevelt 
devoted a major address to rebutting it. Id. 
 59. Kobach, supra note 54, at 1978 (describing the Oregon system). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 178–79. 
 63. See generally Sara Brandes Crook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-So-Distant Mirror: The 17th 
Amendment and Congressional Change, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 845 (1997); see also Rossum, supra note 
27, at 705–06 n.186. 
 64. The original draft of what would become the Seventeenth Amendment included a change to 
Article I, Section 4, the Elections Clause, that would have given states, and not the federal 
government, sole control over setting the time, place, and manner of Senate elections. See Smith, supra 
note 36, at 41–50. Southern Democrats, who were worried that the federal government might interfere 
with the exclusion of African Americans from voting, defended this proposed change on federalism 
grounds. But the Senate passed the so-called Bristow Amendment, which removed the part of the 
Seventeenth Amendment that would have changed the Elections Clause, before it was sent to the 
states. Id. 
 65. See Smith, supra note 36, at 53.  
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defeat of many senators opposed to direct election, and the 
overwhelming nature of popular opinion in favor of direct election led 
the Senate to send the Amendment to the states in 1912.66 It took less 
than eleven months for three quarters of the states to ratify the 
Amendment, and it went into law in 1913.67
One particularly notable part of the debate in Congress and popular 
opinion over the Seventeenth Amendment was the absence of any 
discussion about the effect that weakening state control over the Senate 
might have for federalism. Ralph Rossum wrote: 
 
The popular press, the party platforms, the state memorials, the House 
and Senate debates, and the state legislative debates during ratification 
focused almost exclusively on expanding democracy, eliminating 
political corruption, defeating elitism, and freeing the states from what 
they had come to regard as an onerous and difficult responsibility. 
Almost no one (not even among the opposition) paused to weigh the 
consequences of the Amendment on federalism.68
There were a few exceptions.
 
69 Notably, Senators Elihu Root and 
George Hoar gave several impassioned speeches about the effect of the 
Seventeenth Amendment on the constitutional system of federalism, 
quoting extensively from The Federalist Papers and the Constitutional 
Convention.70 However, proponents of the Amendment did not justify 
their support on the grounds of national unity or centralization, but 
instead focused on other issues.71
This history leaves many questions: Where did the near-universal 
support for direct election of senators come from? Why was there no real 
opposition inside the state legislatures that the Amendment 
disempowered? Why was there virtually no discussion during the long 
debate over the Seventeenth Amendment of the harm it did to state 
governmental authority? 
 Root and Hoar’s federalism-based 
defense did little and the Senate passed the Amendment. 
There are a number of reasons scholars usually give for the passage 
of the Seventeenth Amendment, most notably the rise of the Progressive 
movement and problems related to the specifics of state legislative 
selection, including unfilled senatorial seats and corruption in the 
selection of senators. A close look shows that each explanation has force, 
but none explain the aforementioned questions raised by the history of 
the Seventeenth Amendment. 
 
 66. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 176. 
 67. See, e.g., 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Direct Election of U.S. Senators, Nat’l 
Archives, http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/17th-amendment (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 68. Rossum, supra note 27, at 711–12. 
 69. That is, exceptions in addition to the argument over the proposed change in the Elections 
Clause, which was debated largely on federalism grounds. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 544. 
 70. Rossum, supra note 27, at 713–14. 
 71. Id. at 714–15.  
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The traditional story is that the rise of the Progressive and Populist 
movements led to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. Much of 
the popular argument for the Amendment sounded in Progressive 
rhetoric: opposition to corrupt state legislatures bought by seedy business 
trusts and powerful party machines, dislike for corrupt “elite” 
representation, and extensive faith in the ability of the people to govern 
when impediments to their rule were removed.72
But revisionist scholars have persuasively shown that this story is, at 
very least, overly simplified.
  
73 While the Progressive and Populist 
proponents of direct elections were indeed prominent at the time of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, the claim that the Amendment’s success can 
be explained solely by their support is problematic. After all, despite 
other major successes in the electoral field (such as women’s suffrage, state 
constitutional amendments providing for initiatives, non-partisan elections 
and council-manager systems at the local level), the Seventeenth 
Amendment was the Progressives’’ only success in reforming the structure 
of the federal government.74 Other proposals for structural change at the 
federal level, like abolishing the Electoral College, made little or no 
headway.75 Even at the state level, where Progressives were successful in 
passing major election reforms, they were largely unable to rally mass 
support for changes to the form of legislatures.76 For instance, numerous 
Progressive proposals for unicameral legislatures in the states were 
defeated.77
Moreover, merely pointing to the broader success of the Progressive 
movement does not explain the breadth of support for the Seventeenth 
Amendment. Urban political machines, usually opponents of “goo-goo” 
 If nothing else, one must explain why this component of the 
Progressive agenda was more successful than others. 
 
 72. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 153–210 (a contemporary summary of the arguments in favor of 
direct election); Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 185–86 (noting that the conventional 
wisdom on the Seventeenth Amendment is to credit the Progressive movement). 
 73. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 184–95; Bybee, supra note 2, at 538–45. 
 74. Thomas E. Baker, Towards a “More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts on Amending the 
Constitution, 10 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 11 (2000) (noting the support of the Progressives for the 
Nineteenth Amendment, which provided for female suffrage); Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, 
at 194 (noting Progressive support for recall and referenda at the state level); Schleicher, City Council 
Elections, supra note 19, at 465–67 (describing Progressive support for non-partisan elections and 
council manager systems). 
 75. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 194–95. 
 76. See John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in the 
Progressive Era, 30 Rutgers L.J. 933, 963–64 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (“As a result, although the 
various alternatives to the traditional bicameral arrangement attracted a fair amount of support in 
several of the state conventions, and came within a single vote of being approved by the Nebraska 
Convention, none of these proposals was ultimately adopted, at least during the Progressive era. It was 
not until 1935 that Nebraska became the first and only state to enact a unicameral system, through an 
initiative procedure.”). 
 77. Id. 
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Progressives, also supported direct election.78 Direct elections also 
attracted support from big business interests, which either had an 
oppositional or ambivalent relationship with the Progressive and Populist 
movements.79
Most importantly, a story built around the rise of the Progressive 
movement cannot explain the absence of state-based opposition. This 
was, after all, the era of Jim Crow and states, particularly southern ones, 
resisted other intrusions on the scope of their power.
 
80 Most Southern 
legislatures had passed resolutions calling on Congress to pass a 
constitutional amendment providing for direct elections well before it did 
so.81
Explanations rooted in the specifics of the practice of the state 
legislatures face similar problems. Two common arguments during the 
debates over direct election were that state legislatures were corrupt in 
their selection of senators and that deadlocks in state legislatures 
resulted in unfilled senatorial seats.
 State voters can achieve policy ends only by acting through state 
legislatures. Groups of voters that regularly won state legislative 
elections, and influential interest groups inside state legislatures, were in 
a position to reject direct elections. Any persuasive theory of why the 
Seventeenth Amendment passed needs to explain why voters, interest 
groups, and politicians who were winning at the state level, and thus had 
the power to appoint U.S. senators, decided to give this power away and 
use an alternate method in which their influence would be less certain. 
Although the Progressives and Populists—strong political forces in the 
early twentieth century—pushed for the Seventeenth Amendment, their 
influence alone cannot explain the overwhelming popular and political 
support for the direct election of senators. 
82
 
 78. See Richard Hofstatder, The Age of Reform 254 (1955) (“If big business was the ultimate 
enemy of the Progressive, his proximate enemy was the political machine.”). See generally John D. 
Buenker, The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment, 56 J. Am. Hist. 305 (1969) 
(describing urban political machine support for the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 Deadlocks could persist because an 
1866 federal law required the votes of a majority, and not merely a 
 79. See Hofstatder, supra note 78, at 254 (noting opposition between big business and the 
Progressive movement); Smith, supra note 36, at 66 n.328 (describing business support for the 
Seventeenth Amendment); Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 185 (arguing that the 
Progressive movement was not opposed to business interests). 
 80. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: 
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1009 (2003) (“Trust in state 
governments enjoyed a resurgence during the late Nineteenth Century, particularly after public 
opinion turned against the northern occupation of the South and the Union programs of 
Reconstruction.”); Forrest McDonald, States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776–
1876, at 208–23 (2000) (“[During this period] attempts to encroach upon the powers reserved to the states 
were struck down by the Supreme Court and were disapproved by the vast majority of Americans.”). 
 81. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 108. 
 82. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 539–43. 
I - Schleicher_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:46 AM 
1060 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1043 
plurality, of state legislators to elect a senator.83 Although these 
arguments were certainly a large part of the campaign by proponents of 
direct election, they do not fully explain how the Seventeenth 
Amendment passed. While there was certainly some corruption in 
selecting senators, politics is never free of the stench of the improper, 
and there needs to be an explanation for why of all sources of corruption, 
reformers targeted local election of for elimination by constitutional 
amendment.84 Also, the alleged sources of that corruption—business 
groups powerful at the state level and political machines—were key 
supporters of direct elections. If these groups had the power to sneak 
through senators over popular worry about corruption, there needs to be 
an additional explanation for why they did not have enough power to 
stop direct elections—and in fact did not want too. Deadlock as an 
explanation is particularly odd because there were not that many seats left 
unfilled;85
Leading revisionist scholar Todd Zywicki uses the “tools of public 
choice” to explain the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.
 those empty seats resulted from a change in federal law that 
could have easily been changed back without amending the Constitution. 
86 Zywicki 
argues that the Amendment passed due to lobbying by national special 
interest groups, ranging from business trusts to unions.87 These groups, 
he claims, supported the Amendment for several reasons: it would 
reduce the cost of lobbying for favorable legislation by national interest 
groups because lobbyists would only have to engage with one body and 
not fifty;88 it would increase the length of senatorial tenures, permitting 
interest groups to form long-term relationships with senators;89
 
 83. See Election Laws, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ 
contested_elections/election_laws.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (discussing the 1866 Act and the 
resulting election delays).  
 and it 
would reduce monitoring of senators because state legislatures were 
better at ensuring that senators did the bidding of the voting public 
 84. Also, there are substantial questions about how much actual corruption there was. Bybee, supra 
note 2, at 539 (“Between 1857 and 1900, the Senate investigated ten cases of alleged bribery or corruption, 
although in only three cases was a Senate committee able to conclude that the charges had merit.”). 
 85. Id. at 542 (“Between 1891 and 1905, eight state legislatures failed to elect senators and were 
without full representation from periods of ten months to four years.”). 
 86. Zywicki makes these claims over the course of two articles: Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra 
note 2, and Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2. While there is much debate about 
how to define public choice, the simplest and most encompassing definition was given Dennis Mueller: 
“The economic study of non-market decision making, or simply the application of economics to 
political science.” Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II, at 1 (1989). 
 87. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 216; Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra 
note 2, at 1039, 1054. 
 88. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 215–17; Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, 
supra note 2, at 1032–33, 1040–41. 
 89. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2, at 1048–49, 1052. 
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rather than special interest groups.90 National interest groups thus had an 
interest in direct elections because it made the Senate easier to lobby.91
These claims provide interesting arguments for why certain interest 
groups might have supported the Amendment when it was proposed in 
Congress. But there are reasons to be skeptical that Zywicki’s argument 
can explain what is really perplexing about the history of the Amendment. 
 
To start, it is difficult to understand why any one interest group 
would expend substantial resources on a structural constitutional issue as 
a lobbying strategy. Even if the Seventeenth Amendment benefited all 
national interest groups, each interest should have faced a collective action 
problem counseling against spending resources in favor of this type of 
constitutional change that would benefit all national interests equally.92
 
 90. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 207–09; Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, 
supra note 2. at 1041–42. 
 
More pressingly, even if Zywicki is correct about the incentives of 
national businesses and political interests, the increased nationalization 
of politics would surely create losers as well as winners. According to 
Zywicki, those who were harmed by the Seventeenth Amendment—such 
as state-based businesses, rural interests who benefited from unequally 
sized districts in the state legislature—should have been relatively more 
powerful inside state legislatures. Their influence with state legislatures is 
exactly what would have made them lose out as a result of the passage of 
the Seventeenth Amendment. If Zywicki’s is correct, the last holdouts 
against the Seventeenth Amendment should have been resistant state 
legislatures, but the opposite is true. State legislatures and state branches 
of the national political parties led the fight for direct election. There is 
nothing in the historical record that reveals national interest groups 
becoming newly and heavily involved in state legislative debates over the 
subject. 
 91. Zywicki also argues that Western states, who had already implemented direct elections, had 
an interest in passing the Seventeenth Amendment because Eastern states had long-serving senators 
and introducing popular elections might remove these senators, opening up committee and leadership 
positions for Western senators. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2, at 1048. 
While this may have played a role, support for direct election was national. Support in Eastern states 
like Pennsylvania, Maine, and New Jersey was strong enough for their state legislatures to call for a 
Constitutional Convention in order to pass an amendment in favor of the direct election of senators. 
There were also calls for a convention in Midwestern states like Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin, and Southern states like North Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, and 
Texas. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 764–89 (1993). All Eastern states with the exception 
of Rhode Island, which never voted, ratified the Seventeenth Amendment. One Western state, Utah, 
voted not to ratify. All of the rest of the non-ratifying states were either Southern or border states. See 
Rossum, supra note 27, at 711. 
 92. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2, at 1054 (acknowledging that there is 
no evidence of lobbying by particular interest groups). 
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Thus, the most significant problem with the revisionist take on the 
Seventeenth Amendment is one it shares with the mainstream history it 
challenges. Neither can explain the absence of opposition among the 
state legislatures, state-based interest groups, and successful state 
political groups that it disempowered. 
Although success in politics is often either over- or under-determined 
and has a degree of randomness, existing explanations are just not up to 
the task of explaining why the movement for direct elections succeeded. 
II.  Why Was There No State-Based Opposition to the 
Seventeenth Amendment? National Political Parties and State 
Democracy 
Extant explanations of the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment 
have one common feature—they look at who supported the Amendment 
and why. This is only half of the story. The more interesting part is why 
there was not opposition to the direct election of senators among state 
officials and interest groups powerful in state legislatures who were 
losing power. This Part argues that the lack of opposition can be 
explained in part by changes in the political party system. 
A. A Brief History of Political Parties From the Civil War to the 
Seventeenth Amendment 
It is necessary to go through a (too) quick history of American 
political parties in order to recount this tale. By the mid-1830s until the 
run-up to the Civil War, and then again after the War, American politics 
had the rough outlines of a two-party system.93 Voting was largely 
partisan, but non-ideological, with loyalty to state and local parties based 
on ethnic and cultural ties.94 State parties dominated newspapers, 
campaigning, and the distribution of ballots.95
After the Civil War, the two-party system became far stronger. The 
number of votes for independents dropped dramatically, except for one 




 93. See Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from 
the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era 162–81 (1986); William Shade, Political Pluralism and 
Party Development: The Creation of a Modern Party System, 1815–1852, in The Evolution of 
American Party Systems 77, 103–04 (Paul Kleppner et al. eds., 1965). 
 Further, parties—both the two major 
parties and a few minor parties, especially the emerging Populists—
 94. See Pradeep Chhibber & Ken Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems: 
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States 209–
10 (2004); Paul Kleppner, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870–1980, at 47 
(1982) (“Above all, politics was party politics.”). 
 95. See Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 210–11; McCormick, supra note 93, at 164–66, 
172–73, 179, 201. 
 96. Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 166–73. 
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became more national.97 Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman created a 
figure, “party aggregation,” which measures how national a party system 
is. Party aggregation is calculated by determining the difference between 
the numbers of parties competitive nationally and the average number of 
parties competitive in each district.98
Outside of two elections with small spikes in the early 1890s and in 
1912 (after the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment), the party 
system was fully aggregated after 1870.
 In a fully aggregated system, every 
party that was competitive in any congressional election would also be 
competitive in all other congressional races. That is, if the system is fully 
aggregated, there would be no state- or district-specific parties or 
candidates. 
99 Further, national political 
parties won a high percentage of the vote in each congressional election 
between 1876 and 1912, except for 1894.100
The key turning point, Chhibber and Kollman note, occurred in the 
1870s.
 
101 For most of the nineteenth century, the national parties were in 
many ways coalitions.102 Rather than having one name and organizational 
structure, the national parties were composed of groups from each state 
that did not run candidates against one another but were formally and 
organizationally separate.103 After the 1870s, the parties unified and 
“stamped out the proliferation of labels and both coalesced under singular 
labels.”104 Party was also increasingly the key determinant of legislative 
behavior in Congress. Party line voting increased substantially between 
1876 and 1894.105
Why the parties began to nationalize is a difficult question. Based on 
comparative research in the United States, India, Canada, and Britain, 
Chhibber and Kollman argue that parties nationalize following the 
centralization of political power.
 
106 That is, as power moves from states or 
provinces to the federal government, party structure follows. “As policy-
making authority migrates towards higher levels of government, voters 
will be more inclined to choose candidates who adopt party labels at 
broader levels of aggregations.”107
 
 97. Id. at 210. 
 However, after a great deal of 
 98. They ran the same test against the number of competitive parties at the state level and the 
data shows an identical narrowing. Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 169. 
 99. “[P]arty aggregation in the United States has been relatively successful since the 1870s. It blips 
upward several times during the 1890s and the 1910s, but is quite low otherwise.” Id. at 173, 166–69. 
 100. Id. at 170. 
 101. Id. at 211. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 208–16. 
 104. Id. at 215. 
 105. Paul Kleppner, Partisanship and Ethnoreligous Conflict: The Third Electoral System, 1853–
1892, in The Evolution of American Party Systems 114, 139 (Paul Kleppner et al. eds., 1965). 
 106. See Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 21. 
 107. Id.  
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centralizing during the Civil War, the period in question here—roughly 
the 1870s to 1913—centralizing and decentralizing forces were both in 
play.108 Chhibber and Kollman describe this as an “ambiguous” period.109 
However, the parties continued the trend toward national aggregation 
throughout the period.110
Although it is difficult to explain why parties aggregated as much as 
they did during this period, it is easy to see a temporal connection between 
this aggregation and the movement for the direct election of senators. 
Despite furious battles about state rights in other policy areas, this is 
when the campaign for the Seventeenth Amendment took off.
 
111 Through 
the late 1870s and 1880s, groups agitated for direct election, proposing 
constitutional amendments, and pushing for party primaries and direct 
election substitutes on the state level.112 However, as the movement built, 
a major political event happened: the realignment of 1896.113
Although party organizations began to nationalize, state branches of 
parties retained differentiated local flavors through the 1870s and 1880s.
 
114 
Voter turnout during this period was extremely high—the highest in 
American history—and strong ethno-cultural-religious links between 
groups and parties made politics fierce, competitive, and stable, with voters 
consistently supporting the same party election to election.115 “[L]ate 
nineteenth century parties [were] strongholds of localist resistance to 
political centralization.”116
This changed in the 1890s. Political scientists have debated endlessly 
how to define the term “realignment” and whether the major change in 
the American political system happened in 1894 as a result of the Panic 
of 1893 or in 1896 as a result of the Presidential campaign between 
Republican William McKinley and Democrat William Jennings Bryan.
 National parties were unable to provide 
support for (or against) cross-sectional and cross-societal national policy 
programs because their bases of political support differed from state to 
state. That is, the national parties were not ideologically defined. 
Democrats from New York shared little in common with Democrats 
from Ohio or South Carolina. Thus, despite becoming national in scope, 
the parties remained coalitions of distinct state-based institutions. 
117
 
 108. See id. at 156. 
 
 109. Id. at 156–60. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 114. Kleppner, Partisanship and Ethnoreligous Conflict, supra note 105, at 140. 
 115. Id. at 124. 
 116. Id. at 140. 
 117. William Schneider describes the timing and existence of realignments as “The Eternal 
Question.” See William Schneider, Realignment: The Eternal Question, 15 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 449 
(1982). All discussion of realigning elections begins with V.O. Key’s work. See V.O. Key, A Theory of 
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Regardless, at some point in the mid-1890s, American politics changed 
dramatically. Republicans gained an advantage they would hold until 
1912.118 Importantly, party support became heavily regional. Republicans 
dominated the populous Northeast, industrial Midwest, and most of the 
West Coast, while Democrats controlled the South and competed 
strongly in the interior West.119 Third parties nearly died out as effective 
national forces. The Senate had twelve third-party members in the late 
1890s but did not have a single one after 1903.120 Few third-party 
members were elected to the House either.121
After 1896, Congress became highly professionalized, with each 
party having a strong whip organization to line up votes and control 
committee assignment, resulting in a high degree of cohesiveness in party 
voting, at least until the very end of this period.
 
122 This high degree of 
cohesiveness was driven by ideology: the parties became far more 
programmatically coherent. “[T]he 1896 realignment . . . was the result of 
cross-cutting issues that polarized the parties.”123 Debate inside parties 
was also largely national and regional, not state-specific, with each 
party’s Progressive movement challenging party regulars across the 
country.124
At the same time, politics became less based on popular rallies and 
organization, and became more media driven.
 After 1896, the parties were more ideologically consistent. 
125 This is easiest to see in 
the famous difference between William McKinley victoriously 
campaigning from his back porch, a model of the new style of parties, 
and William Jennings Bryan attending old-time religion mass rallies.126
 
Critical Elections, 17 J. Pol. 1, 18 (1955). For a debate over the date of the beginning of the 
realignment of 1896, compare Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of 
American Politics 38 (1970), with James Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and 
Realignment of Political Parties in the United States 156 (1983). 
 
The parties’ responses to the Depression of 1893—free silver for the 
 118. Walter Dean Burnham, The System of 1896, in The Evolution of American Party Systems 
147, 171–83 (Paul Kleppner et al. eds., 1965). 
 119. Joel Budgor et al., The 1896 Elections and Congressional Modernization: An Appraisal of the 
Evidence, 5 Soc. Sci. Hist. 53, 54 (1981); Burnham, The System of 1896, supra note 118, at 171–75. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Party Division in the Senate, 1789 to Today, U.S. Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 
2014); Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 166. 
 122. See David Brady et al., Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 
1880–1920, 14 Legis. Stud. Q. 205, 206 (1989). 
 123. David Brady & Joseph Stewart, Congressional Party Realignment and Transformations of 
Public Policy, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 333, 352 (1982). 
 124. Howard L. Reiter, The Bases of Progressivism Within the Major Parties: Evidence from the 
National Conventions, 22 Soc. Sci. Hist. 83, 86 (1998). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Presidential Elections 1896–1996: 1896: William McKinley v. William Jennings Bryan, N.Y. 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/elections/1896/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
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Bryanite Democrats, tariffs and support for industry for Republicans—
led not only to massive regionalization, but also to reorganization of 
politics in the states.127 The ethno-cultural-religious links between groups 
and parties in the pre-1896 era fell away.128 Turnout, which reached its 
apex right before the realignment, collapsed as a result of the decline in 
competitiveness in many states and the breakdown of the ethno-cultural 
links between groups and parties.129 Reforms, such as the introduction of 
primary elections and the secret “Australian” ballot, reduced the import 
of state party organizations.130
B. Why the Nationalization of Political Parties Mattered: Voter 
Behavior and Political Parties 
 The political parties of the turn of the 
century were substantially less programmatic and centralized than 
today’s parties, but they were far more programmatic and centralized 
than they had been prior to 1896. 
The timing of the nationalization of political parties lined up almost 
exactly with the movement for direct elections. As the parties began to 
centralize their operations and develop ideological programs, the states 
began their push for direct elections. This Subpart argues that there are 
strong theoretical reasons to think that the centralization and newly 
found ideological character of national parties depressed opposition to 
direct elections in state legislatures. This Subpart shows that, all else 
equal, stronger national parties should mean that national politics plays a 
bigger role in state elections, leaving state officials and state-centric 
interest groups with less control over their political destinies. To the 
extent that groups dominant in state legislatures felt that the role of 
national elections increased the risk that they might lose, they should 
have been more likely to support changes that would have separated 
state and national politics. 
Parties play a particular role in the life of a democracy. Voters have 
little information about individual candidates and little reason to learn 
 
 127. See Kleppner, Who Voted?, supra note 94, at 73–82. 
 128. Id. at 55 (“The realignment of 1894–96 altered the political conditions that had driven late-
nineteenth-century electoral participation. It reduced partisan competition in most areas of the 
country. In the nation’s urban-industrial Metropole, it displaced the earlier congruence between social 
cleavages and party oppositions. The coalitional agreements created by the ‘System of 1896’ eroded 
the older linkages among group subcultures, partisan identification, and turnout rates, without 
replacing them with any news bases for social-group reinforcement. . . . The result was a participating 
electorate that was considerably shrunken in size from its late-nineteenth-century level, and one that 
more nearly approximated our own in its internal patterns of stratification by age cohorts and 
economic status.”). 
 129. Id. at 33. 
 130. Id. at 58–59. 
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such information.131
Party labels help voters in a number of ways.
 Political party labels provide the information voters 
need in order for elections to serve their intended purpose of ensuring 
representation and accountability.  
132 To the extent that 
party labels accurately describe the ideological commitments of candidates 
running under their banner, voters only have to learn the meaning of the 
party label rather than the positions and histories of the numerous 
individual candidates on the ballot.133 To the extent that the incumbent 
represents one party, voters do not need to rely on what politicians say, 
but rather can review how government has performed. If parties are 
ideologically consistent over time, voters can use their observations to 
develop “running tallies” (in Morris Fiorina’s famous turn of phrase),134 
allowing them to recall policies and practices they noticed and liked 
about each party and use their observations to inform their vote. These 
“running tallies” allow voters to vote roughly as if they were informed 
even if they do not know much about the candidates or relevant issues.135 
Further, the party label appears on the ballot, unlike interest group 
endorsements, meaning that it is easy (or easier) to link observations 
about the world to the actual voting decision. And because aggregate 
performance is a better indicator of future behavior than individual 
performance, the overall electorate can behave rationally and responsively 
on what political scientists call a “macropartisan” level even if many or 
most voters are ignorant of basic political facts.136
 
 131. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 371–72 (discussing work by Anthony Downs 
and Joseph Schumpeter on why there is no instrumental reason to become informed about politics and 
summarizing research on actual voter knowledge); Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What 
Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters 75–93 (1996) (summarizing data on voter 
knowledge). To be fair, the information about voters’ political knowledge is based on survey data that 
does not cover the period in question, but given the consistently weak individual incentives to become 
truly informed, there is little reason to believe voters in the 1880s were different in this respect from 
voters today.  
 
 132. The following paragraphs are a very short version of the lengthy literature review in 
Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 370–85 (summarizing research). 
 133. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 112–15 (1960) (showing how 
party labels can allow voting even under low information). 
 134. Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections 89–106 (1981). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 378 (“Finally, much revisionist work has 
centered on the aggregate competence of the electorate. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro pointed 
out that bits of information that register with a few voters will nonetheless move mass opinion so long 
as unobservant voters stay constant in their views, or shift their views in some random, uncorrelated 
fashion. Moreover, the famed Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that a mass of individuals each of whom 
has only a slightly better than fifty-fifty chance of getting the right answer to a question will 
collectively get the answer right almost one hundred percent of the time, so long as the individuals act 
independently of one another. This has become known as the miracle of aggregation: acting together, 
even barely informed individuals can function as a well-informed collective.”). See generally Robert S. 
Erikson et al., The Macro Polity (2002) (finding that voters allocate responsibility to parties in ways 
that are rational in aggregate, which they call “macropartisanship”). 
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The capacity of the electorate to develop running tallies about 
political parties affects the behavior of individuals in office. If the parties 
are competitive, then they have incentives to cater to the preferences of 
the median voter.137 And if they are long-lived, parties have incentives to 
perform well in order not to sully their reputation.138 Well-functioning 
parties, thus, help even a largely uninformed electorate to use elections 
for their intended purpose: producing responsive and accountable 
government.139
One need not overstate this case. Many voters have relationships 
with political parties that are more social or affective than ideological. 
Membership in a party can be handed down from parents to children or 
across social groups, preceding preferences about governance and 
serving as a “perceptual screen” for thinking about politics.
 
140 That is, 
many become Democrats or Republicans and then adopt policy views to 
fit the preferences of co-partisans.141 Even policy-minded voters are 
frequently myopic, caring too much about events that occur right before 
an election. Voters also have trouble assigning functional responsibility 
to office holders and frequently take into account facts about the world, 
from shark attacks to college football results, which are clearly outside 
the control of the people on the ballot.142
 
 137. See Downs, supra note 133, at 105–12. 
 But virtually everyone who 
studies elections agrees that party labels are important tools—and almost 
 138. See John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in 
America 49–50 (1995). 
 139. That competition provides an incentive for officials to cater to the median voter does not 
necessarily mean that the results will necessarily equal the preferences of the median voter. For instance, 
an influential—and quite convincing—line in modern scholarship on political parties suggests that party 
policy is driven by “intense policy demanders” inside parties, largely activists and interest groups. In these 
models, inter-party competition and interest in the long-term value of the party brand act as a constraint 
on the policies these intense demanders can influence party officials to adopt, rather than an independent 
incentive for incumbents seeking re-election and office seekers to cater to median-voter preferences as it 
appears in Downs. See generally Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy 
Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 Persp. on Pol. 571 (2012). 
 140. This theory was famously developed in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter 120–
41 (1960). 
 141. More accurately, almost all voters do this to some extent, but vary in how affective and how 
rational their party identification is. See Elemendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 402. 
 142. Id. at 378–81; Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We’re Thinking: The 
Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, 2006), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/thinking.pdf (explaining biased perceptions and presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association); Larry M. Bartels & Christopher Achen, 
Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks (Vanderbilt Univ., Working 
Paper No. 5-2013, 2009), available at https://my.vanderbilt.edu/larrybartels/files/ 2011/12/CSDI_WP_05-
2013.pdf (discussing how irrelevant facts influence elections and presented at the Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions); Andrew J. Healy, Neil Malhotra & Cecilia H. Mo, Personal Emotions and 
Political Decision Making: Implications for Voter Competence (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research, 
Paper No. 2034, 2009), available at https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/detail1.asp?Document 
_ID=3269 (discussing the influence of sporting results on elections). 
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certainly the most important tools—uninformed voters have to ensure 
that elections promote responsive and accountable governance.143
However, the value of a party label is better thought of as a variable 
than a constant. Party labels are less and more descriptive of candidates’ 
beliefs at different times.
 
144 Further, party labels that are accurate at one 
level can be barely descriptive at other levels. Seeing that a candidate for 
the House of Representatives is a Democrat or Republican in today’s 
heavily polarized Congress will tell the voter almost everything she needs 
to know about the candidate’s future voting record.145 In contrast, finding 
out whether a candidate for city council in most big cities is a Democrat 
or Republican will tell you very little; local parties rarely take consistent 
stands on local issues.146 However, the quality of the information 
expressed by the party label does not determine the likelihood of that 
information being used, even by rational voters. For instance, voters in 
local elections rely on party labels heavily, even though they are weakly 
descriptive on a candidate’s stances, because most voters have little 
knowledge about the policies and performance of city council members.147 
Democrats dominate national elections in big cities, which translates 
directly into dominating local legislatures, even though preferences on 
national and local issues are only weakly correlated.148
European political scientists have given a name to this type of 
election—“second-order elections.”
 
149 When an election at one level of 
government turns on voter preferences on performance and policies at 
another level, it is second order. The classic example of this is elections 
for the European Parliament. These elections choose officials who make 
European Union policy, but their results turn entirely on the popularity 
of Prime Ministers in each European country.150
 
 143. See Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 
 As discussed more in 
Part III, second-order elections can be a result of election laws that 
promote “mismatch,” or the use on local or supranational ballots of party 
19, at 143–44 (reviewing literature).  
 144. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 384. 
 145. Id. at 405, 421. 
 146. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 440–47; Cheryl Boudreau et al., Lost in 
Space?: How Endorsements Affect Spatial Voting in Low-Information Elections (Univ. Cal. Davis 
Research, Paper No. 328, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232371 
(presented at the 2012 Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. See generally Karl H. Reif & Hermann Schmitt, Nine Second-Order National Elections: A 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results, 8 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 3 (1980). 
 150. See id.; Simon Hix, What’s Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It 80–84 
(2008) (discussing European Parliament elections as second-order elections); Schleicher, What if 
Europe, supra note 19, at 119–30 (same). 
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labels defined at the national level, and inhibit the development of 
differentiated brands for each level of government.151
We see this phenomenon in elections for offices like European 
Parliament or City Council, where there is no formal link between the 
activities of officials at each level. But formal ties between levels of 
government—like giving state legislatures the power to appoint 
senators—should increase the likelihood that elections at the lower level 
of government will be second order. If you know a vote for one party’s 
candidate for state legislature will have a desired effect on national 
politics, but do not know its effect on state politics, basing your vote 
entirely on national issues is perfectly rational. 
 
The changes in political parties that started in the late 1870s and 
took off after 1896 affected the meaning and utility of party labels. The 
party labels increasingly described national political coalitions and 
differences in ideology about what the national government should do.152 
As the party labels became more accurate in describing how senators 
would vote on national issues, it increasingly became more reasonable 
for voters to use this label to determine their voting patterns in state 
legislative elections if they wanted to achieve national level policy 
changes, or to hold national parties accountable for their performance. 
That is, clearer party labels made it increasingly possible for state voters 
to use state legislative elections to influence national politics. The change 
in the meaning of party labels, thus, should have a direct relation to the 
degree to which preferences about national issues—such as tariffs, the 
Spanish-American War, and antitrust—determined voting patterns in 
state legislative elections.153
State elections, particularly in an era of “dual federalism” like the 
period during the run-up to the Seventeenth Amendment, theoretically 
should have turned on different issues than national elections, as the 




 151. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 394–408; Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19, 
at 119–30; Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 453–57. 
 Further, state 
elections should serve as referenda on the performance of state officials 
and state government. But if the information made available to generally 
uninformed voters through party labels increasingly tracks national 
politics and not the stances and performance of state politicians on state 
 152. See supra notes 116–127 and accompanying text. 
 153. This is perhaps better seen as a discussion of the utility of party labels on accountability rather 
than representation. As parties described national coalitions more accurately before the Seventeenth 
Amendment, it became more reasonable for voters to use state legislative elections to hold the party 
in power at the national level accountable for its performance in office because world events—such as 
the tariff rate or unemployment rate—were more easily attributed to all officials of that party. 
 154. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1950) (describing 
the existence and fall of dual federalism). 
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issues, and state officials choose national officers, state elections should 
track national results. 
This is even true for voters who care more about state issues than 
national ones. It is a relatively safe assumption that turn-of-the-last-
century voters were without much information about individual 
candidates for state legislature and that party labels provided them with 
their most (and probably only) useful tool for figuring out how to vote in 
state legislative elections on ideological grounds. Unless state parties 
create state-specific brands in voters’ minds, state-motivated voters will 
use their national preferences in state elections if that information is 
conveyed by the party labels.155 The reason is that there is likely some 
correlation between national and state political preferences. In the 
absence of other information, it makes sense to rely on even weak 
heuristics.156
The theory that changes in party organization and meaning had a 
causal effect on the degree to which state legislative voting tracked state 
issues and assessments of the performance of state officials rather than 
national ones is not the only theory consistent with the facts. Another 
possibility is that changes in party structure were epiphenomenal and the 
real cause of changes in party and state legislative voting patterns was the 
increased nationalization of the government and/or the economy. One 
could argue that, as the government and economy became more national, 
there was greater incentive among legislators to form ideologically 
coherent parties and state voters had greater reason to use state legislative 
elections to determine Senate races rather than state policy. This cannot be 
ruled out, although it is worth noting that throughout the period there was 
also a strong push for decentralization and leaving power in the hands of 
states.
 As party labels increasingly described national political 
commitments rather than state-based ethno-religious coalitions, the 
degree to which national issues determined the votes of state-minded 
voters likely increased, as these voters relied on party labels in the 
absence of any other means of determining their vote in state elections. 
157
Most likely, the party structure reflected the increasing 
nationalization of preferences and served as an independent force in 
making state elections turn on national issues because of its role in 
providing information to voters. But for the purposes of this Article, 
whether the nationalization of the parties is a result of the nationalization 
of preferences or a cause is not particularly important. What is important is 
that whatever happened, the change seems to have made state issues 
relatively less important in state legislative elections. 
 
 
 155. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 398–400. 
 156. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 449. 
 157. See Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 156.  
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This theory—that there should be a causal relationship between the 
form taken by political parties and the role of national politics in state 
elections—can help answer the key question about the history of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, namely why it was popular among the state 
legislatures it disempowered. The nationalization of the meanings of 
party labels meant that state legislative elections were influenced to a 
greater degree by trends in preference for national parties. As state 
legislative elections turned more on the performance of national officials, 
state legislators, state parties, and state-based interest groups lost control 
over their own fate. 
State legislators might have reasonably felt that they wanted more 
agency over their own fates and thought that having separate elections 
for senator and state legislator would allow voters to segment national 
politics from their minds when voting in state elections. Perhaps more 
importantly, state-based interests—from state parties to rural groups to 
local businesses—may have wanted to be able to influence election 
results at the state level without worrying that their efforts would be 
foiled by changes in far-off Washington (or beyond, if elections turned 
on foreign affairs). Groups that would otherwise have been assured of 
victory, due to popular support or financial muscle, could face unexpected 
losses if the election turned on national events. Those powerful in each 
state thus had an incentive to fight against linkages between state and 
national politics. And state legislators, responsive to those powerful at 
the state level, were likely responsive to this desire among state interest 
groups to divorce state and national politics as a constitutional manner. 
Additionally, the change in party structure weakened the affirmative 
case for state legislative appointment. Recall that in the founding period, 
one of the justifications for giving state legislatures the power to appoint 
senators was to give the political culture of each state direct representation 
in Congress.158
This explains why there was little discussion of how the Seventeenth 
Amendment would harm the functioning of American federalism. The 
reason few made this argument may have been that few believed that 
senators still represented state governments or their unique political 
 This type of collective representation was seen as a 
complement to the “individual” representation provided in the House of 
Representatives. But once voting at the Senate level became mostly 
based on the national coalition to which the senator belonged, or even 
the branch of the party to which the senator belonged, senators acted less 
as representatives of the state or its political culture and more like 
ordinary legislators, organized into coalitions based on national and 
regional issues. 
 
 158. See supra notes 28–44 and accompanying text. 
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cultures.159
Finally, the worry that Senate elections were excessively influencing 
state legislative elections helps explain why contemporaneous efforts to 
pass a constitutional amendment to reform the Electoral College failed 
while the Seventeenth Amendment was successful.
 As the parties nationalized and centralized, the logic of having 
state legislatures appoint senators withered. 
160 Although state 
legislatures have the power to determine how electors are selected under 
the original Constitution,161 nothing requires them to select electors 
themselves. Thus, states are able to pass laws that bind electors to the 
results of general elections.162
This is just a theoretical treatment of why there might have been a 
causal relationship between the rise of national parties and the decline in 
opposition to direct elections in state legislatures. Doing much more than 
 Compare this with the Oregon system, 
which had no formal power to bind state legislatures because the 
Constitution specifically placed the power to appoint senators in the 
hands of legislatures. Thus, although they are similar in many respects, 
nothing short of a constitutional amendment could remove senatorial 
politics from state legislative politics, whereas laws setting up a system of 
effectively direct elections for electoral college votes did not require a 
constitutional amendment. 
 
 159. This also explains why there is so little in the record about how the Seventeenth Amendment 
would help or hurt the Democrats or Republicans. While it is amazing to imagine this from a modern 
perspective, people at the time probably imagined that the effect on the parties would be negligible, as 
state legislative elections were already tracking support for U.S. senators. 
 160. There is a limit to the degree to which the nationalization of party labels can capture the full 
range of reasons for the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. The argument here is that the reason 
voters wanted a constitutional amendment (as opposed to simply adopting the Oregon system) was that 
they wanted to limit state legislative discretion in their own state to reduce the influence of national 
politics on state elections. But surely, part of the reason to use the constitutional amendment process was 
also to influence how other states chose their senators. And this story does not explain that. 
 161. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (upholding a state legislative plan to establish 
districted popular votes for the Electoral College). Notably, in states where the state legislature chose 
the electors directly, state legislative elections quickly became second order, with interest in the vote 
for President dominating any state-specific concerns. For instance, the most crucial state in the 
presidential election of 1800, between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, was New York, where the 
state legislature chose the electors. Edward J. Larson, A Magnificent Catastrophe: The 
Tumultuous Election of 1800, America’s First Presidential Campaign 87–106 (2007). When New 
York City voted for state legislature (which would determine control over the state legislature), both 
the Federalists and Republicans campaigned heavily. Id. This state legislative election was treated as a 
national referendum: “The local press focused squarely on national issues, not state ones. The looming 
showdown between Jefferson and Adams subverted the local race to national ends and relegated the 
Assembly candidates to the role of willing surrogates for the presidential aspirants.” Id. at 93. 
Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, who led the Federalist campaign in New York, was engaged in a 
secret game to push the incumbent Adams aside as the Federalist candidate for President by 
promoting “individuals loyal to him for the New York legislature rather than secur[ing] the strongest 
Federalist candidates, some of whom might favor Adams.” Id. at 95–96. Thus, not only did national 
politics dominate state elections for voters that knew the state legislature would choose the President, 
but national politics even dominated the method of choosing candidates. 
 162. See generally Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (holding that faithless elector laws are constitutional). 
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this is difficult, as the argument is attempting to provide an explanation for 
an absence—namely, why did we not see opposition to the Seventeenth 
Amendment among state legislatures. But evidence from debates over the 
Seventeenth Amendment suggests that such a relationship existed.  
C. Debates over the Seventeenth Amendment 
[N]ational interests, the party interests, are so overwhelming163
—Sen. John Palmer 
 
The long public debate over the Seventeenth Amendment, both in 
Congress and in the popular press, focused on two contentions made by 
supporters of direct election: that (1) state legislatures were corrupt and 
easily bought by powerful business interests, and (2) state legislative 
appointment was elitist and anti-democratic.164 There was also debate 
about the effect of choosing senators on the state legislative calendar, 
with many officials arguing that deadlocks and debate over senatorial 
appointments left state legislatures with little time to do the business of 
state government.165
Scholars investigating these arguments, however, have dismissed 




It was . . . frequently asserted that the direct election of senators would 
peripheralize federalism, strengthening state legislatures by forcing 
them to concentrate on state business. It is difficult to understand how 
even the progressive propagandists imagined that depriving legislatures 
of their only control over national affairs would strengthen houses that 
were already decadent for want of a significant agenda.
 William Riker, perhaps the leading scholar 
on the subject, notes that Progressives at the turn of the last century 
considered direct elections to be a move in favor of federalism, but 
dismisses this argument as faintly ridiculous: 
167
Riker fails to notice that the effect of senatorial appointment was 
not only on state legislative time, but also on state legislative elections. 
Although much debate over the Seventeenth Amendment focused on 
the value of elite representation and claims that it would enhance 
democracy, there was, in fact, substantial discussion of the effect of 
senatorial appointment on state legislative elections. Supporters thought 
that holding direct elections for senators would strengthen state 
democracy, not only because doing so would reduce the time state 
legislatures devoted to senatorial appointment, but also because it would 
 
 
 163. 28 Cong. Rec. 6160–61 (1896) (statement of Sen. John Palmer). 
 164. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 153–77, 195–96. 
 165. Id. at 191–95. 
 166. See, e.g., Riker, supra note 46, at 468; Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 195–200. 
 167. See Riker, supra note 46, at 468. 
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allow voters in state legislative elections to focus on state issues rather 
than national ones. 
The evidence for this comes from popular histories of the 
Seventeenth Amendment and debates on the floor of Congress. While 
there little information about the debates in state legislatures, this 
evidence—much of which references such debates—is at least strongly 
suggestive that, at the time, state legislatures were concerned with the 
degree to which state elections turned on state issues during an era of 
national political parties. 
1. Debates in Congress 
There is substantial evidence that the effect of senatorial appointment 
on state legislative elections was a key concern in the debate in Congress 
over the Seventeenth Amendment. Supporters of the Seventeenth 
Amendment argued over many years that national party politics and 
national issues intruded on state legislative elections because state 
legislators had the power to appoint senators. Direct election of senators 
was necessary to make state democracy function. Further, national party 
centralization had already ensured that senators were national political 
figures and not representatives of states, such that the case for legislative 
appointment was unavailing. 
Senator John Hipple Mitchell ran the Oregon Republican Party 
machine for many years, and as a result, his opinions were likely 
representative of Republican opinion in the state legislature.168 Mitchell 
was also one of the leading advocates of direct election, leading the floor 
fight in the Senate.169
Another vital objection to the choosing of Senators by the legislatures 
. . . is found in the fact that in the selection of candidates for the 
legislature whose business it is to choose a Senator, every consideration 
is lost sight of except as to how the candidates, if elected, will vote on 
the question of senatorship. This becomes the vital issue in all such 
campaigns, while the question as to the candidate’s qualifications or 
fitness for the business of general legislation, or as to the views he 
entertains upon the great subjects of material interest to the State—
taxation, assessments, schools, internal improvements, revenue, 
 Both on the floor of the Senate and in accompanying 
editorial writing, Mitchell made clear that the influence of national politics 
on state elections was a major reason for his support. Writing in the 
popular journal The Forum, Mitchell argued: 
 
 168. See Richard Clucas, The Oregon Constitution and the Quest for Party Reform, 87 Or. L. Rev. 
1061, 1069–70 (2009). Senator Mitchell’s name should ring a bell for those who study civil procedure, 
as he played a central role in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Mitchell was an, er, colorful 
character, as Wendy Purdue’s wonderful history of Pennoyer v. Neff makes clear. Wendy Collins 
Purdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 
62 Wash. L. Rev. 479, 482–95 (1987). 
 169. Haynes, supra note 28, at 103. 
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corporations, appropriations, salaries and fees of officers, trusts, 
municipal affairs, civil and criminal code, apportionment and other like 
important subjects—is wholly ignored, and thus not unfrequently, the 
most vital interests of the State are made to suffer from the very fact 
that the question of the selection of a Senator is a distracting and 
disturbing element, not only in the legislature itself, but in the primary 
and other elections involving the selection of members of the 
legislature.170
Mitchell—one of the leaders in the floor debate in the Senate in favor 
of the Seventeenth Amendment—put as one of his central arguments in 
favor of direct elections that it would improve state democracy. He 
repeated this argument on the floor of the Senate.
 
171
Mitchell was not the only senator to raise this argument. Senator 
John McCauley Palmer of Illinois argued that having state legislatures 
appoint senators was less democratic than having the Electoral College 
choose the President because the Electoral College had no other task, 
while state legislatures had to govern states.
 Thus, prior to the 
establishment of the Oregon system of quasi-direct elections, the leader 
of the Oregon Republican Party grounded his argument for direct 
election in part on the costs appointment of senators had on the 
accountability of the state legislature. 
172
It is simply a question whether the legislature, which is charged with 
the duty of conserving the interests of the State, shall be also required 
to separate themselves from those great duties and continue the 
exercise of the power of choosing Senators. That the duties interfere 
with each other nobody can doubt, because if there were no political 
influences—I mean if the legislatures of the States were disconnected 
entirely from the election of Senators—they would be the 
representatives of the real and present interests of the people of the 
States. Now, whatever may be the wants or the necessities of the 
people of the States with respect to local legislation, the legislators are 
elected with reference to the vote they will cast for Senator, and thus 
these duties are made to conflict, and the national interests, the party 
interests, are so overwhelming in comparison with those of the people 
of the States, of the local interests, that a Democratic legislature, or a 
Republican legislature, or a Populist legislature, instead of consulting 
the interests for which they are elected assume at once the sphere and 
field of political action, and if they elect a Senator who is satisfactory to 
the party in power all their shortcomings in regard to the interests of 
the people of their States are forgiven, unless indeed they should be 
guilty of some crime which would subject them to indictment. It is a 
 Giving state legislatures 
the power to appoint senators meant that the only thing that mattered in 
state legislative elections was voter preferences about national parties: 
 
 170. Sen. John H. Mitchell, Election of Senators by a Popular Vote, in The Forum 25, 394 (June 6, 
1896), available at http://www.unz.org/Pub/Forum-1896jun-00385. 
 171. 28 Cong. Rec. 6152 (1896) (statement of Sen. John H. Mitchell). 
 172. 28 Cong. Rec. 6160–61 (1896) (statement of Sen. John Palmer). 
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mixture of authority and a confusion of duties from which the 
legislatures of the States ought to be relieved.173
Palmer was clear that voter preferences about national parties 
dominated state legislative elections, which was why he supported direct 
election. Thus, another leading voice in the Senate on the subject thought 
that the combination of national parties and senatorial appointment led 
voters to ignore state issues when voting for state legislators. 
 
In debates in the House, Representative Henry Tucker III of 
Virginia—later dean of the law schools at Washington and Lee and 
George Washington Universities and President of the American Bar 
Association174—made similar claims. In 1892, he argued that “the power 
given to the Legislature of the State to legislate on local matters for the 
interests of the people should not be interfered with or diverted by 
electoral functions in Federal matters forced upon it under the 
Constitution.”175
[A] state may be greatly interested in a matter of local opinion. The 
political parties of the State may be divided on the subject, and yet the 
people of the State . . . may be in favor of such a law. But as there is a 
United States Senator to be elected in the Legislature, which is to be 
chosen at the same time that the local option bill is sought to be passed, 
the men that are in favor of the bill split their votes between the 
Democratic, the Republican and possibly the third party people. Why? 
In order to elect a United States Senator, when the matter they regard 
as of vital importance at their door is suffered to go down because of 
the injection of the Federal matter into the election of local State 
officers. . . . I would divorce as far as possible the Federal power from 
the State, and I would take away the power which is given under the 
present system which may defeat the local demands of the people 
because of the electoral functions in federal matters conferred upon 
the State legislatures by this provision of the Constitution for the 
betterment of neither and to the injury of both.
 He then went on to explain exactly why senatorial 
appointment interfered with state democracy: 
176
Notice that Tucker’s argument relies heavily on the idea that party 
organizations—the Democratic, Republican, or “third party people”—do 
not divide on state issues but rather on national ones. Representative 
John Small, a Democrat from North Carolina, made a similar claim, 
arguing that changes in the party system were central to understanding 
senatorial appointment: 
 
Another question which now plays a very prominent part in the choice 
of United States Senators was not thought of when the Constitution 
was adopted. The present party system of the United States was not 
 
 173. Id.(emphasis added).  
 174. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Henry St. George Tucker, U.S. Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000399 (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 175. 23 Cong. Rec. 6065 (1892) (statement of Rep. Henry Tucker). 
 176. Id. 
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known, and no prophet had arisen who could fortell what the future 
party organization would be. All who favored the election of Senators 
by the legislatures did so in order to remove those elections from all 
partisanship and to keep them absolutely free from the influence of the 
Federal Government. When the matter was debated in the early days 
of our country’s history the objection was always made that to have the 
election of Senators placed in the hands of the people would be to 
invite corruption and Federal influence.177
Small then claimed that senators were chosen because of the 
influence of the federal government—and particularly the President—
and that they were more responsive to federal party influence than state 
interests. This was contrary, he claimed, to the intended separation of 
powers in the Constitution: 
 
Another fact of common notoriety which can be proved is that the 
election of Senators is not now ever free from Federal influences when 
the legislature of the State which elects the Senator is controlled by the 
same party which controls the Federal Administration. 
. . . . 
  The question of what they are elected for goes to the very 
fundamental principle of the existence of the Senate. If they are 
elected by Federal influences, they can not serve the State as the 
Constitution intended they should. Experience has shown that the 
present method brings about elections by means of Federal 
influences. . . .  
  . . . [T]he United States Senate is not controlled by the States; but 
when the party whip is cracked with orders from the Executive 
Mansion, the Senators obey the whip and fall into line.178
Small was clear that changes in the party system had weakened the 
Founders’ desire for the Senate to provide an alternative form of 
democratic representation from the House and the Presidency. 
 
These are only characteristic of the debates of the period. These 
comments suggest that members of Congress thought that changes in the 
party system were linked both to (1) increasing the cost of senatorial 
appointment by making state legislative elections turn on national issues, 
and (2) reducing the benefits of senatorial appointment because 
appointed senators had become more responsive to national alliances 
than state-specific concerns. The next Subpart addresses how scholars at 
the time thought that the effect of direct elections on state legislatures 
was central to the case for the Seventeenth Amendment. 
2. Scholarship, the Press, and the Case for Direct Election 
In 1906, Political scientist George Henry Haynes published a 
detailed history of senatorial appointment, including a summary of all 
 
 177. 33 Cong Rec. Appx. 315 (1900) (statement of Rep. John Small). 
 178. Id. at 316–17. 
I - Schleicher_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:46 AM 
May 2014]      SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT & FEDERALISM 1079 
arguments for and against direct election.179 Senator Robert Byrd noted 
that it is “an invaluable resource that has yet to be equalled.”180
Haynes lists a large number of arguments in favor of direct election 
and lines up the usual suspects, ranging from the effect of direct election 
on increasing democracy to improving the quality of the Senate by limiting 
the chances of senators being elected only because of their proficiency in 
“the arts of the ward politician.”
 This is 
the most comprehensive existing work on the movement in favor of 
direct election, and provides the most compelling evidence of the 
importance of preserving state democracy as an explanation for support 
for the Seventeenth Amendment. 
181
But Haynes also devotes a whole chapter to how the “popular 
election of Senators would be of advantage to the state and local 
governments.”
 He discusses corruption, the likely 
effect on the wealthy becoming senators, and many other issues. 
182 Haynes summarizes several arguments, but the first and 
central one is that, although state governments have a great deal of 
power, “the spell which the national party casts upon the average voter is 
so strong that he rarely recognizes that, under all ordinary circumstances, 
it is the near-at-hand state government that his life, his liberty and his 
pursuit of happiness are far more essentially affected.”183 Haynes argues 
that the reason for this is clear: “[S]tate politics has been entirely 
submerged by national politics is due, probably, more than to anything 
else, to the linking together of the two in the election of Senators.”184
Haynes acknowledges that even if direct election were enacted, 
candidates for the legislature would likely still run under national party 
banners, but they would “go before the people to be judged upon their 
merits as State legislators, not as counters in the game of federal 
lawmaking or office-winning.”
 
185 Under the appointment system, voters 
face “a most embarrassing dilemma” of having to decide whether to use 
their beliefs about state politics or national party politics when voting.186 
Haynes goes on to detail how voter desire to influence national politics 
allowed political machines to staff state legislatures with party hacks, as 
they knew voters would vote based on the Senate election rather than on 
the candidates running for state legislature.187
 
 179. See generally Haynes, supra note 28. 
 Further, senatorial 
 180. I Robert Byrd, The Senate 1789–1989: Addresses on the History of the United States 
Senate 405 (1988). 
 181. Haynes, supra note 28, at 153–210, 171. This argument was a little odd, as if direct elections 
would reduce the power of candidates who were good politicians. 
 182. Id. at 180. 
 183. Id. at 180–81. 
 184. Id. at 181. 
 185. Id. at 184. 
 186. Id. at 185. 
 187. Id. 185–86.  
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appointment stood in the way of states agreeing to redistrict their 
legislatures to allow for more representative politics in state legislatures.188 
Senatorial appointment also encouraged national politicians to influence 
state politics. Haynes notes that the telegrams from national party leaders 
to state officials responsible for appointing senators took “on a dictatorial 
tone.”189
Herman Ames, who surveyed arguments in favor of direct election 
as part of an award-winning history of constitutional amendments 
written in 1897, also expressed concern about the corrupting influence of 
senatorial appointments by state legislatures.
 
190 He notes that proponents 
thought that direct election was more democratic, less likely to lead to 
corruption or excessive corporate influence, would result in more 
deserving candidates, and would end deadlocks.191 He also notes that 
“the advocates of popular elections claim that the evils of the present 
method, which tend to the introduction of national affairs into State 
politics and lead to the election of members of the State legislatures on 
national instead of local issues, would be diminished.”192
These reviews of the literature cite numerous examples of this 
theme showing up in the scholarship and popular press of the time, and it 
takes no great feat to find many others.
 
193
The relationship between national party platforms and the need for 
direct election is perhaps made clearest in a remarkable editorial in the 
Chicago Tribune in 1894. This editorial actually rebuked candidates for 
state senator for running on state issues: 
 While it was only one 
argument among many, it is clear that the influence national elections 
had on state elections was one of the planks of the argument for direct 
election. The argument was aided by the clarity of the national party 
positions. 
 
 188. Id. at 182–84. 
 189. Id. at 199. 
 190. IV Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States During the First Century of Its History 63 (1897). 
 191. Id. at 62–63. 
 192. Id.  
 193. See, e.g., Charles James Fox, Popular Election of U.S. Senators, 27 Arena 455, 461 (1902) (“[T]he 
question as to how a person will vote for senators has become an important but illegitimate factor in his 
qualification for the state legislature.”); Edwin Maxey, Some Questions of Larger Politics 72 (1905) 
(arguing that “members of the legislature are chosen, too frequently not with a view to their fitness to 
serve their State in the capacity of legislators, but because they favor this or the other candidate for 
United States Senate”); Haynes, supra note 28, at 184 n.4 (“This election of senators by the state 
legislatures has insured the subordination of state to federal politics; maintained party divisions that were 
natural in the national field in a field (municipal as well as state) where they were uncalled for and 
mischievous; made the ‘final end’ of a legislature not the proper affairs of the State, but the election of 
state senators in the interest of national party supremacy; constrained the conscience of men to vote for 
unworthy candidates for the legislature lest the party at Washington should be imperiled, and in a word, 
prepared the way for the absolute domination of the machine as we see it today.” (citation omitted)). 
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Do these Democratic State Senators think the voters can be called off 
from the national issues involved in the direct election of 
Representatives and the indirect election of a Senator to consider only 
local questions. That they will drop the Wilson bill and devote their 
attention to the establishment of a Police Board in Chicago? That they 
will lose their interest in the currency—in the silver question and the 
taxation of State bank notes—and become wrapped up in the question 
whether the Chicago park boards shall be elective or appointed. . . . 
The people are not such fools. They are not such children that they can 
be induced to consider the abolition of the Town Assessor system at a 
time when they are doubtful whether the Democratic tariff policy will 
leave them anything which is worth assessing.194
Put together, these sources indicate that people during the debates 
over direct election were quite worried about the influence that national 
issues had on state legislative elections. The documents also show that 
leaders linked this to the fact that the parties were national in scope and 
ideological in form. The political science literature shows that this was 
newly the case around the time the movement for direct election took 
off, and that the parties became more national and more ideological as 
pressure mounted to change the Constitution to allow for direct election. 
While this is not proof that the changes in party form had a clear causal 
effect on support for the Seventeenth Amendment, it is highly suggestive 
of this. 
 
The next Part analyzes what this relationship reveals about modern 
arguments over the Seventeenth Amendment and federalism more 
generally. 
III.  The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism Theory 
This Part will discuss the implications of the fight over the 
Seventeenth Amendment for how we think about federalism, both in 
scholarship and judicial opinions. The history of the Seventeenth 
Amendment has substantial and important lessons for how contemporary 
federalism works in practice. 
A. The Seventeenth Amendment and the Problems of Political 
Safeguards of Federalism 
Legal scholars have long debated whether and how courts should 
police the lines of authority provided in the Constitution.195
 
 194. The Want to Dodge National Issues, Chi. Trib., May 14, 1894. 
 Herbert 
Weschler, in one of the more famous essays in American legal scholarship, 
lays out a strong argument that courts should largely stay out of disputes 
 195. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (describing the “proper division of 
authority between the Federal Government and the States” as “perhaps our oldest question of 
constitutional law”). 
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between the federal government and the states.196 Weschler argues that, 
instead of relying on courts, the Framers created “political safeguards of 
federalism” or structural and cultural limits on federal encroachment on 
state powers.197 Structures like the Electoral College, the fact that 
representatives in the House are allocated by state and not purely by 
population, and the very existence of the U.S. Senate, with its equal 
representation for each state, serve to protect the interests of the states.198 
This obviates the need for courts to police federal authority. The 
Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
relied on Wechsler and others as reason to avoid a heavy-handed review 
of Congressional authority.199
Larry Kramer, in two well-known pieces, rejects Wechsler’s 
characterization of the efficacy of the structural protections for states, 
but argued that there were other political safeguards for federalism.
 
200 
Federalism, Kramer argues, is the constitutional protection of the 
“regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy 
choices.”201
Kramer claims, however, that there were in fact strong political 
safeguards for states because politics was organized at the state level.
 The Constitution’s structural provisions may protect interests 
that reside in states, but they do not protect the authority of state 
governments to legislate against federal encroachment. For instance, the 
Electoral College may give ethanol producers in Iowa more influence than 
they would have in a system of purely popular elections for President, but 
this does little to protect the regulatory authority of the state government 
of Iowa. 
202 
The Framers understood that the real protections for states were not in 
“Wechsler’s tidy, bloodless constitutional structures,” but were rather 
provided by “real politics, popular politics: the messy, ticklish stuff that 
was (and is) the essence of republicanism.”203
 
 196. Wechsler, supra note 21, at 558–59. 
 State leaders would drum 
up opposition to federal encroachment on their authority and could 
count on popular support due to the greater connection with the people 
 197. See generally id. 
 198. He notably does not discuss the Seventeenth Amendment at length. See Kramer, 
Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1503 (noting the oddity of Weschler’s decision not to 
discuss the Seventeenth Amendment extensively). 
 199. 469 U.S. 528, 550–51, 551 n.11 (1985) (citing Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the 
National Political Process 175–84 (1980)). 
 200. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 221–27; Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1503–15. Kramer also critiques Weschsler’s reliance on “cultural 
foundations,” as these were more likely the result of other protections for states, rather than being an 
independent source of protection for states. Id. 
 201. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 222. 
 202. Id. at 257.  
 203. Id.  
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and greater regulatory ambit.204
The modern version of this is state-based political parties. 
Compared with European political parties, American parties have been 
less “programmatic”—ideologically coherent and committed to achieving 
an ideological agenda—and less “centralized”—run by a top-down 
national organization.
 The political safeguards of federalism lay 
in the political power of state leaders to rally popular support. 
205 Instead, Kramer argues that America’s parties 
were largely run by state and local politicians and activists.206
In the 1990s, when Kramer wrote his two classic pieces, the 
weakening of the party system that occurred in the 1970s was already 
giving way to our currently heavily polarized party system.
 The power 
of state politicians over political parties gave them control over federal 
elections, which in turn protected states as institutions, as federal 
government overreaching could be punished through use of the party 
apparatus in elections. 
207 Kramer 
notes that, while the parties may be growing more centralized and 
programmatic, state parties have retained substantial influence.208 
Further, a new form of protection has emerged: the states’ role in the 
administration of federal programs.209
While the power of states as part of the administrative process has 
been substantially fleshed out in recent times and shown to have real 
teeth, the story of state parties as political safeguards has not fared as 
well because the trend that began before Kramer’s articles has become 
even more significant.
 Because the federal government 
relied on state governments to administer its policies, states had all sorts 
of protections against excessive federal intrusions. 
210
 
 204. Id. at 258–66. 
 Today’s political parties have become 
substantially more programmatic and centralized. Congress is more 
polarized than ever, with the party affiliation defining almost all 
 205. Id. at 278–87; Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1520–42. 
 206. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 280. 
 207. Id. at 280–83. See generally Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged 
Citizens, Polarization & American Democracy (2010) (cataloging and attempting to explain the 
increasing polarization of political parties and elites over the last thirty years); Nolan McCarty et al., 
Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006) (highlighting the history 
of polarization in Congress). 
 208. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 278–89. 
 209. Id. at 283–87 
 210. For a small taste of the work on the relationship between states and federal administrative 
agencies, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 
1256, 1275–80 (2009) (discussing how uncooperative behavior by states implementing federal laws 
resulted in policy changes); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic 
Power, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1225, 1227 (2001) (discussing the influence of state regulators in federal 
administrative regimes); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights 90 (2009) (citations omitted) (noting that state participation in federal 
regulatory regimes “provides a prime example of the operation of cooperative federalism”). 
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variation in congressional voting and with substantial distance between 
the mean policy preferences of each parties’ legislators.211 Organizational 
control over party strategy has flowed to national organizations like the 
congressional campaign committees and Presidential campaigns. Since 
the 1970s, each party’s candidates have become more similar to one 
another ideologically, no matter what type of district they run in.212 
Presidential candidates are similarly growing more ideologically 
distinct.213
Kramer acknowledges that “parties change constantly,” but also 
claims that their decentralization and non-programmatic nature have 
been relatively constant.
 There is little evidence that state parties exert any meaningful 
control over members of Congress; members are responsive to national 
and not local trends and control. 
214 From this, he argues that state parties have, at 
least until the most contemporary period, consistently provided political 
safeguards for federalism.215
The story of the Seventeenth Amendment shows that political 
parties were changing a great deal even prior to the last few decades. The 
increased ideological definition and organizational centralization of the 
two major parties in the period after 1896 made national politics a more 
significant part of state elections, reducing the degree to which state 
politicians mattered to election results. The move toward programmatic 
and centralized parties in the early part of the twentieth century was not 
as dramatic as we would see in the early part of the twenty-first century, 
but it represented a decrease in the strength of the non-formal political 
safeguards of federalism. As the non-formal safeguards weakened, 
support for a formal political safeguard of federalism, the power of state 
legislatures to appoint senators, also withered. 
 
Kramer’s arguments about the political safeguards of federalism 
have been criticized by modern judicial federalists for failing to 
acknowledge that informal safeguards are contingent on the existence of 
a particular political order, rather than absolute like the Constitution’s 
 
 211. Abramowitz, supra note 207, at 140–44 (describing changes in polarization in Congress); 
McCarty et al., supra note 207, at 3; Jacob Jensen et al., Political Polarization and the Dynamics of 
Political Language: Evidence from 130 Years of Partisan Speech, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, 
Fall 2012, at 1, 5–6 (analyzing language used in congressional debates to find that polarization increased 
for thirty years although at lower rates than during New Deal period and earlier). 
 212. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 Am. J. Pol. 
Sci. 136, 136 (2001). 
 213. See David Andersen et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential 
Elections, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 395, 396–98 (2008) (noting that Presidential candidates have become 
more ideologically distinct, leading to voters become better at voting “correctly” or in line with their 
ideological preferences). 
 214. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1523. 
 215. Id. at 1524. 
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guarantees.216
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Seventeenth 
Amendment is less about safeguards and more about the very basic 
question of what those safeguards protect. Kramer writes: “federalism is 
meant to preserve the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to 
legislate policy choices.”
 The history of the Seventeenth Amendment provides an 
example of how shifts in the political order can affect state governmental 
power in the federal legislature. Thus, while the history of the 
Seventeenth Amendment provides an important caveat to Kramer’s 
arguments about judicial enforcement of federalism, it also provides 
substantial support for his analytical claim that we should look to how 
political parties function to understand how federalism works. 
217
B. The Seventeenth Amendment and the Problem of Conflating 
Federalism with State Authority 
 The next Subpart shows that this elides an 
important distinction between state regulatory authority and popular 
authority at the state level. 
Scholars and politicians have rather endlessly debated whether 
national or state-based solutions to specific policy questions are superior. 
There has been a similarly endless debate about whether the 
Constitution—either as interpreted by courts or implemented by political 
institutions—should do more to protect state policymaking from federal 
encroachment, that is, should we have more federalism or more 
nationalism. Most of these discussions, as Kramer’s previous quote 
suggests, have either clearly stated or tacitly assumed that increasing and 
protecting state regulatory authority—including the power of state 
entities to make policy decisions—is what federalism protects from 
encroachment by the federal government.218
 
 216. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 115–16 (2001). 
 The idea that federalism 
 217. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 222. 
 218. Perhaps the clearest expositor of this view is Ernie Young. In his terrific article, The 
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, Young argues that functional arguments in favor of federalism 
should be understood to protect state autonomy and not state sovereignty, or rather than sovereignty, 
or separation and protection from national authority. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two 
Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 50–52 (2004) (“[I]t makes sense to look to the underlying values that 
federalism is generally thought to serve. . . . They tend to fall into two loose groups. The first is 
concerned with regulatory outcomes: Federalism permits a diversity of regulatory regimes from state 
to state, which may allow satisfaction of more people’s preferences, regulatory experimentation, and 
competition among states to provide the most attractive regime. The second group has to do with the 
political process itself: State governments provide a check on national overreaching, foster political 
competition and participation, and may even help build social capital. Autonomy, not sovereignty, 
provides the common theme of all these arguments. Just having state governments is not enough; 
those governments need to have meaningful things to do. Federalism cannot provide regulatory 
diversity unless states have autonomy to set divergent policies; state governments cannot provide fora 
for political participation and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora. The 
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equals state authority or autonomy, whether it is enforced by courts or 
protected by the institutional design of the federal government, is almost 
universal.219
Something subtly different emerges, however, when one considers 
the equally endless and unbelievably varied normative justifications for 
federalism. Most normative justifications for federalism rely on an 
assumption that state majorities will be able to use elections to promote 
their policy preferences. That is, the benefits that run from having a 




It may seem safe to assume that the power of state officials to enact 
policies and the power of majorities inside the state to choose policies are 
the same. After all, state government officials are elected by majority 
vote. However, the history of the Seventeenth Amendment shows us is 
that, under certain conditions, there are powers states can hold that 
reduce the capacity of state voters—real and not hypothesized voters, full 
of warts and empty of some important relevant political knowledge—to 
affect policy decisions at the state level. Thus, increasing state power in 
some instances can actually reduce the benefits of federalism. 
 
 
sovereignty model of the Rehnquist Court’s working majority on federalism issues, by contrast, has 
emphasized the separate and independent existence of the states, as if mere existence were the primary 
value to be preserved. The Court’s focus on the states’ sovereign immunity from private lawsuits, for 
example, has expended much time and political capital on an issue that has little to do with what functions 
remain for state governments to perform.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Young fails to note that there is a distinction between state autonomy and making state policy 
responsive to state majorities. And that the latter principle is responsible for the normative arguments 
in favor of federalism, in ways that increased autonomy can sometimes inhibit. 
 219. There are some exceptions. Most notable is the work of John McGinnis and Ilya Somin. See 
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal 
System, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 89, 89–92 (2004). Taking off from the well-known section from New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–182 (1992), which argued that federalism sometimes had to be protected 
from state officials who would rather cede responsibility to the federal government, McGinnis and Somin 
lay out a full-throated argument that state autonomy and federalism are substantially different. Id. at 90. 
While Somin and McGinnis do not focus on the formal bounds of connection between state governments 
and the federal government, like state legislative appointment of senators. 
 220. One potential objection must be noted. Malcolm Feely and Edward Rubin distinguish 
federalism as a theory from local democracy largely on the grounds that “federalism reserves 
particular issues to subnational governmental units, regardless of the political process that exists within 
these units.” Malcolm M. Feely & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic 
Compromise 31 (2008). I do not disagree with this statement, at least in theory, as it is not difficult to 
imagine federal systems with major non-democratic elements (for instance, with provinces run by 
unelected tribal chieftains). But for Rubin and Feely, federalism exists to protect distinct political 
identities. In systems where state-based political identities are expressed democratically (as in the 
American system, where states must provide republican government), the case for federalism does rely on 
the quality of local democracy, and the benefits of federalism are eroded by giving states powers that limit 
the ability of locals to choose local policies. 
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This is broadly true across most normative theories of federalism.221 
For instance, the benefits of federalism that flow from the smaller size of 
states as polities, and the theoretical improved responsiveness of policy 
to majority preference that results from this smaller size, will not appear 
if state-based voters make their decisions based on national issues. 
Giving states control over national political results can make state 
elections more second order, and hence less responsive to state opinion 
on state issues. Sorting, or Tieboutian, theories of the benefits of 
federalism rely on states providing many different choices for mobile 
citizens.222 If the Constitution forces national decisions on state 
legislatures, this could result in a reduction in the differences between 
state policies, as they take, for instance, either Democratic or Republican 
form and do not provide a wide range of choices. The legislatures 
running “laboratories of democracy” will experiment less if they get little 
electoral credit for successful innovations. If state legislative elections 
turn largely on a race for a senator, there is little reason for state 
legislators to bother with innovative, costly to devise, and risky new 
ideas.223 Theorists who argue that federalism can help solve the conflicts 
that arise from the existence of geographically specific cultural 
differences in big countries, like Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feely, need 
state politics to express local identity, which can be frustrated if the 
constitutional organization leads to state voters making national 
decisions when choosing state legislatures.224 The benefits of inter-
jurisdictional synergy through “cooperative” or “uncooperative” 
federalism rely on the existence of inter-jurisdictional differences and 
competencies.225 And so, normative justifications for federalism rely on 
the quality of state democracy.226
 
 221. For a nice summary and categorization of theories of federalism, see generally Erin Ryan, The 
Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism: The Tug of War Within, in The Ways of 
Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain (Alberto 
López-Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013). 
 
 222. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 
(1956) (arguing that diffusing power to many local governments will produce an optimal provision of 
local public services under some conditions). 
 223. The term laboratory of democracy derives from New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and 
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593, 594 (1980) (arguing that 
limited electoral incentives for state officials results in suboptimal amount of state policy innovation). 
 224. Feely & Rubin, supra note 220, at 15–38. 
 225. Schapiro, supra note 210, at 45 (providing an argument for benefits of federalism that flow 
from “cooperative” or “symphonic” inter-jurisdictional synergy). See generally Bulman-Pozen & 
Gerken, supra note 210 (providing an argument that federalism promotes benefits from 
“uncooperative federalism” or inter-jurisdictional conflict). 
 226. An exception might be drawn for checks and balances theories of federalism, or arguments 
that the reason to give states power is that it limits the ability of national majorities to push their 
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This has a number of implications. First and foremost, advocates of 
repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, from scholars like Zywicki and 
John Yoo to jurists like Justice Scalia to politicians like Rick Perry, do so 
because they think that repeal would enhance the values associated with 
federalism.227 They are wrong. Although state elections still turn heavily 
on national issues, repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would make 
state elections turn on national issues to an even greater degree. This 
would reduce the quality of state democracy and thus reduce the quality 
of American federalism.228
 
policies absent widespread agreement. Even if state elections are merely another sphere in which 
national politics expresses itself, the existence of many states each with some degree of autonomy 
means that it will be more difficult for a national majority to achieve its objectives. Even if this is the 
case, the effect of giving states powers that render their elections second order has a somewhat 
ambiguous effect on checks and balances. If a President is elected with coattails, then he and the national 
government will have greater power if state elections follow national ones. State officials elected because 
of the President (and who will be reelected only if the President is popular) will have incentives to push 
the President’s agenda in areas where Congress cannot legislate due to constitutional constraints or a 
sheer lack of time and resources. However, where the President’s party is rejected in off-term state 
elections, as is often the case, his power will diminish and there will be greater checks on federal power. 
Thus, giving states control over national entities like the Senate, which encourages state elections to be 
second order, will affect the strength of checks and balances in the system. Having state elections turn on 
state issues will mean a more steady check on the power of national officials. As we are particularly 
worried about the existence of checks following landslide elections (when other checks are not 
available), the effect of second-order elections on checks and balances is likely negative, even if there 
are times when second-order elections increase checks on the presidency. 
 
 227. See Rick Perry, Fed Up! Our Fight to Save Washington 42–44 (2011); Zywicki, Beyond the 
Shell, supra note 2, at 166; John Yoo, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, The Corner: Nat’l Rev. 
Online (Oct. 22, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/250726/repeal-17th-
amendment-john-yoo. 
 228. It should be noted that this requires a simplifying assumption that voter preferences are either 
separable (their voting preference at the state level is not conditional on who is in charge at the 
national level) or non-separable in a way that does not create a “doctrinal paradox.” See generally 
Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 
110 Colum. L. Rev. 687 (2010). To the extent preferences are separable, state democracy would be 
made worse off by repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, as voters could not use state elections to 
hold state officials accountable without it affecting their preferences in federal elections. If state voters 
care more about federal policy or the party system is organized in ways to make choosing in federal 
elections easier, then state democracy will suffer. However, if preferences at the state and national 
level are non-separable, there are certain preference orders that would result in voters being either 
better served or no worse served by linkages between the two types of elections. It is not difficult to 
imagine such preferences. For instance, before a voter supports a high-tax party at the state level, she 
may want to ensure a low-tax party is in charge at the national level. If preferences take this form, 
choosing state and federal officials separately can lead to a negative outcome for some voters (in the 
example above, high or low tax parties in charge at both levels). This is an application of the “doctrinal 
paradox” identified by Lewis Kornhauser and Larry Sager. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. 
Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 10–13 (1993); see 
generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986). 
But the assumption here is a modest one. First, non-separability of preferences only harms the normative 
conclusion that the Seventeenth Amendment was bad for state democracy if preferences in the electorate 
take a form where they are prone to cycling results and parties behave in a specific way, following the 
platforms they announce even if things change at another level of government. Given that much voter 
assessment is retrospective based on holding incumbent officials responsible for results rather than 
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Second, other institutional rules that link federal representation to 
state legislative elections also reduce the benefits of federalism. Franita 
Tolson argues that partisan gerrymandering is a “safeguard of 
federalism.”229 She argues that states can use their power over 
congressional districting to protect their interests.230 Like arguments 
made by supporters of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, Tolson’s 
claim ignores the harm that linking levels of government can cause to 
state politics. Because states have the power to gerrymander, federal 
officials, organizations, and interest groups all become heavily involved 
in state elections prior to redistricting, flooding state elections with 
outside money, all in the name of affecting Congress.231
Even more commonly, the federal government shares responsibility 
in some policy areas with state governments. Rather than implementing 
its own policy, the federal government engages in “cooperative 
federalism,” and in doing so achieves certain benefits, including greater 
local tailoring of policies, mixing the differing competencies of state and 
federal governments, and gaining legitimacy and efficacy from the 
involvement of state actors.
 Gerrymandering, 
like state legislative appointment of senators, turns state legislative 
elections into proxy fights for control of Congress, reducing the 
accountability of state officials for state policy. The power to 
gerrymander, thus, reduces the quality of state democracy and hence the 
benefits of federalism. 
232 Such mixing of responsibility also allows 
for “uncooperative federalism,” for which state officials use their 
involvement in policy areas to dissent, thus creating new nodes for 
political disagreement and better public debate.233
 
promises, state officials have strong incentives to produce positive results for voters, which requires 
taking into account what is happening at other levels of government. Further, state legislative elections 
in the pre-1913 world did not determine more than a little about the makeup of federal power; state 
legislatures each only chose two senators (and one at a time), and had no direct effect on the House or 
the President. Thus, even fully informed voters with non-separable preferences should have in most 
instances voted as if their preferences were separable as the practical effect of the linkage was small. 
Finally, it is unlikely that voters could develop enough information about candidates, parties, and policy 
interactions between the state and federal level to operationalize a set of non-separable preferences (even 
though the mere fact that voters behave naively and not strategically does not eliminate the possibility 
that they were in fact made worse off by breaking the link between the Senate and state legislature). As a 
result, the assumption that the doctrinal paradox does not seriously imperil this normative claim, but it 
is an assumption. Thanks to Michael Gilbert for forcing me to think about this. 
 But sharing 
responsibility across types of government has a cost in terms of its effect 
 229. See generally Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 
2010 Utah L. Rev. 859. 
 230. Id. at 860. 
 231. As Michael Kang notes, “the most aggressive offensive gerrymanders during the recent cycle of 
congressional redistricting occurred after energetic intervention by federal-level party leaders.” Michael 
S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 443, 465 (2005). 
 232. See Schapiro, supra note 210, at 45. 
 233. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 210, at 1259. 
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on accountability. Research shows that voters have some ability, 
although not a great deal, to assign responsibility to different levels of 
government.234 Where possible, voters can use elections at each level to 
hold officials accountable for the effect of policies they have enact. 
Where policy responsibility is mixed, however, it is more difficult for 
voters to use elections at any level to hold officials accountable. As John 
McGinnis and Ilya Somin posit, this harms the efficacy of federalism 
across a number of dimensions.235
This discussion further problematizes Kramer’s theory of the 
political safeguards of federalism.
 
236 Kramer argues that interaction 
between state parties and national politics protects the values of 
federalism by protecting state authority. Interaction between national 
and state parties, however, can result in weakening the ability of state 
voters to control state policy. Thus, the very safeguards Kramer finds for 
the formal authority of states can reduce the functional benefits of 
federalism.237
C. Can State Democracy Work? 
 
This story of the Seventeenth Amendment has an ironic ending. If a 
goal of the Amendment was to reduce the influence voter preferences 
 
 234. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 404–05. 
 235. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 219, at 109–12. 
 236. James Gardner wrestles with some similar questions about Kramer’s work in a recent draft. 
James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties and the National 
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & Pol. 1, 58–59 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191150. However, Gardner does not explain the mechanisms through which 
national politics influences state politics, except to note that parties are involved. Id. 
 237. It may, however, serve to improve the democratic process at the federal level. In a recent 
paper, Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues that second-order elections at the state level may be good for 
national politics, as the minority party at the national level will have, through its control of state 
governments, avenues through which it can provide actual examples of how alternatives to the 
majority party’s approach will work, and opportunities to frustrate the majority party’s agenda 
through “uncooperative federalism.” Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 
1077, 1105–08 (2014). Voters using state elections to comment on national politics are thus, Bulman-
Pozen argues, providing a democratic good—making federal politics work better by having a more 
efficacious check on majority party power. Id. at 1191 n.192. Bulman-Pozen’s work is challenging and 
fascinating, but the costs of whatever improvement the existence of second-order elections at the state 
level provides to national level discourse are quite high. As argued above, second-order state elections 
reduce or eliminate accountability for state level officials, reduce the variation in state policy and thus 
harm the benefits from sorting and choice of law, and harm the degree to which state policies follow 
state voter preferences, at least to the extent that states are doing things other than merely rearguing 
national issues. Although states and the federal government do deal with some issues in common, the 
most important national issues—such as war and peace, monetary policy, and deficit spending—have 
no state policy analogues (states are generally barred from any of these issue areas by the 
Constitution, federal laws, or state constitutions). Thus, it is difficult to see this benefit to federal 
democratic discourse as more than a small offset to the costs to society of having second-order state 
elections. 
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about national politics had on state elections, it has largely failed. 







Figure 1: Democratic Seat Change in State House  
and U.S. House Elections238
 
 
When Democrats or Republicans are popular and do well in national 
elections, they usually win elections at the state legislative level as well. 
Despite the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislative 
elections still largely turn on federal issues. 
If the Seventeenth Amendment was intended in part to separate 
state politics from national politics, then why did it not succeed? Perhaps 
the reason is the existing bond between states and the national 
government, like the power to gerrymander, but I doubt this has more 
than a small effect. More likely, the information provided on the ballot 
linking national and state politics explains the failure of the Seventeenth 
Amendment to separate state and national politics. The Seventeenth 
Amendment focused on the structural constitutional connection between 
 
 238. This chart was prepared by Steven Rogers and it and the underlying data is available upon request. 
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state governments and the national government created by state 
legislative appointment of senators. But what makes state legislative 
elections substantially second order are the laws and politics that create a 
unified party system. 
The source of second-order elections is frequently “mismatch” in 
the party system. Today more than ever, parties are defined by the 
national political commitments of their candidates and members.239 
Voters see the endorsement of these national coalitions on the ballot, 
and because voters know little about individual candidates, it is rational 
to use these heuristics about national politics in state and local elections 
if there is any correlation at all between national and local preferences. 
The result is what we see in the chart above—voters use their 
preferences about the President and Congress to determine their vote for 
state legislature or city council. At the local level, this is particularly 
dramatic; the correlations between national and local voting can be 
extremely high.240 In state legislative elections, there is some evidence 
that some voters care somewhat about the actual performance of the 
state legislature; this influence is more pronounced if voters actually 
know which party is in the majority. But as Steven Rogers has shown, the 
largest influence by far on state legislative elections is the approval rate 
of the President.241
Accountability and representation in state government suffer as a 
result. One might think that when a state that, say, is largely Republican at 
the national level chooses a largely Republican state legislature, the quality 
of representation—the degree to which voter preferences are translated 
into policies—is relatively high. This would be a mistake. An absence of 
competition at a level of government means little accountability based on 
performance for the actions of incumbent officials. While high profile 
governors face retrospective evaluation on the performance of state 
economies, the low salience of state legislative races means that they face 
few consequences when the policies they enact go badly.
 The dominance of national parties in many states 
means there are a large number of uncompetitive state legislatures. 
242
 
 239. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 402. See generally Schleicher, City Council 
Elections, supra note 19; Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19; David Schleicher, I Would but I 
Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Limits Big City Corruption, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 277, 288 
(2010) [hereinafter Schleicher, I Would but I Need the Eggs]. 
 Further, 
primary elections are low-information affairs, as voters do not have 
access to high-value heuristics like party labels in primaries. There is thus 
 240. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 420, 458–59. 
 241. See Rogers, supra note 18, at 22–24. 
 242. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 398–400 (discussing differences between 
Gubernatorial and state legislative elections). 
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little reason to believe that these state legislatures are responsive to 
differences or changes in preferences among majority party supporters.243
Also, the issue areas in which state governments and the federal 
government make policy are at least somewhat distinct. Although there 
are many policy areas in which the policy responsibilities overlap in this 
era of cooperative federalism, issues that dominate national politics and 
drive voter party identification often have no local analogue. For 
instance, states are either barred by the Constitution, state constitutions, 
or preemption by federal law, or have largely been edged out by 
comprehensive federal policy in policy areas like counter-cyclical deficit 
spending, monetary policy, war-making, trade, treaty making, and 
healthcare and social security for retirees.
 
244 Further, the mobility of 
residents and capital puts some limits on the ability of states to engage in 
the type of redistributive taxing and spending that is possible at the 
national level, although the strength of these limits is more limited than 
many suggest.245 In many of the most important areas of state 
governmental policymaking, the federal government is a junior partner, 
like private law subjects, land use, family law, criminal law, and, 
traditionally at least, education.246
As a result, there is little reason to expect that state elections that 
are responsive to national trends will produce particularly representative 
state policies. And in fact they do not. In the leading recent paper in the 
field, Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips find that opinion majorities among 
state residents on specific issues are no more likely to have their 
preferences chosen by state government than if policies were chosen at 
random.
 While voters’ preferences on state 
policies are surely correlated with their preferences about national 
policies, there is no reason to think that they are the same. 
247
 
 243. For an extensive discussion of the problem of voter ignorance inside party primaries, see 
generally id. 
 Even opinions held by super majorities of the state population 
 244. See generally Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The 
Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 187 (2010) (stating 
that states are generally barred by their constitutions from engaging in counter-cyclical deficit 
spending); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544 (2010) (discussing 
how Social Security and Medicare are exclusive federal programs); see also Ernest A. Young, Dual 
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 139, 
145 (2001) (discussing how treaties, trade, and monetary policy are exclusively granted to the federal 
government).  
 245. See generally Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19 (reviewing literature on effect of 
mobility on local redistributive spending, and arguing that agglomeration economies allow even local 
governments to engage in substantial redistribution); Schleicher, I Would but I Need the Eggs, supra note 239. 
 246. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Stephen Breyer, 
Judicial Review: A Practising Judge’s Perspective, 19 O.J.L.S. 153, 154 (1999) (“[T]he 50 states, not the 
federal government, are responsible for much of American law, including family law, property law, 
contract law, tort law, most criminal law, and most other commercial law.”). 
 247. Lax & Phillips, supra note 22, at 149. 
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win in state legislatures barely more than sixty percent of the time.248
These facts contradict a basic application of Anthony Downs’s well-
known median-voter theorem. Downsian models assume that a party 
that is not in power—say Massachusetts Republicans or Wyoming 
Democrats—will adopt policy positions on state issues that appeal to 
50.01% of the voting public and therefore become competitive.
 
State legislative elections just do not produce particularly accountable or 
representative government, and this is largely a result of the fact that 
state elections turn on national, rather than state-specific issues and 
performance. 
249
First, laws limit the development of differentiated local and state 
parties. In order to operate like a party in a median voter model, the 
minority party must be able to adopt a clear platform on issues relevant to 
the office that appeal to the median voter. Election laws make this 
difficult. State laws often limit the ability of voters to belong to different 
parties at different levels of government or switch easily back and forth.
 So why 
don’t state parties that lose virtually all state legislative elections, like 
Massachusetts Republicans or Wyoming Democrats, do so and reap 
electoral rewards? Downsian models are inconsistent with what we 
perceive in the world, levels of government where there is an effectively 
permanent lack of partisan competition. In a series of papers, I have 
developed three explanations: laws that inhibit rebranding, voter difficulty 
in differentiating parties at different levels of government, and an 
imbalance of voters who form their party preference on non-ideological 
grounds. 
250 
Laws frequently also require primary elections, and as a result, a local 
minority party will face difficulties fielding a consistent and competitive 
slate of candidates, as the party’s primary electorate and candidate base is 
likely to be comprised entirely of voters on a distant fringe of the 
municipality’s ideological spectrum. Further, where the issues that are 
decided by the state or local government are orthogonal to or only weakly 
correlated with the main dimension of national politics, there is no reason 
to believe that a primary electorate and candidate base determined by 
national preferences will be able to agree on local or state policies that 
would appeal to the jurisdiction’s median voter.251
 
 248. Id. 
 The base of, say, the 
Republican Party of New York City is unlikely to be able to field a set of 
ideologically coherent and competitive candidates across offices, as it is 
 249. See Anthony Downs, supra note 133, at 114–49 (1957). 
 250. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 448–60. Also parties earn automatic 
ballot access for down-ballot races—including races for city offices—through a strong showing in the 
gubernatorial race. Id. at 450, 450 n.108. This makes it difficult for third-party entrants, as they have to 
pass an established party in order to become one of the top two vote getters. 
 251. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 404–06. 
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likely too far to the right for the average New York resident on issues that 
correlate with national politics and too unorganized on issues that do 
not.252
At the local level, there is substantial evidence that the major parties 
do not behave like median-voter parties. Instead, a party is only weakly 
correlated with local issue preference.
 As a result, the party cannot build a locally competitive brand and 
voters use their national preferences in local non-mayoral elections. 
253 At the state level, some parties 
have made efforts at rebranding themselves on state issues.254 But even 
where state-issue rebranding occurs, it frequently does not seem to matter. 
For instance, based on survey data of legislators and voters, Massachusetts 
Republican legislators have issue stances that are very close to those of the 
median Massachusetts voter.255 And yet they lose badly every election.256
The second and third examples may help explain this.
 
257 Voters may 
not know state legislative party issue stances and may have substantial 
difficulty figuring them out. In order to vote retrospectively, voters have 
to know which party is in power and what policies they decide. Voters at 
the state level often fail at both of these tasks. First, figuring out who is 
responsible for different policies between federal, state and local officials is 
frequently quite difficult for voters.258 Second, state voters frequently do 
not know which party is in power in the state, making retrospective voting 
on state issues difficult.259 Third, where one party has dominated politics 
for a long time, this becomes particularly difficult. Voters have no basis for 
assessing a long-term minority party’s promises and may simply not 
believe them when they say they will behave like the state median voter.260
Finally, differences among voters may explain the failures of state 
democracy. Since the 1950s, we have known that some voters’ 
 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. This is despite the fact that voters frequently have relatively clearly organized preferences on 
local issues. See generally Boudreau et al., supra note 146 (finding that San Francisco voters have 
preferences on local issues that fall into two camps but that these preferences do not translate into voting 
patterns); see also Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 396–98 (arguing that local parties have little 
coherent ideology); Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 439–43 (same). 
 254. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 400. 
 255. See generally Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures and 
Individuals in a Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels 
(Jan. 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697352. 
 256. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 400. 
 257. See id. at 396–99. 
 258. For anyone, in fact. David Schleicher, From Here All-the-Way-Down, or How to Write a 
Festschrift Piece, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 401, 415 n.12 (2012) (“Voter ignorance is not a problem of a 
benighted ‘they,’ but rather is a problem for all of us who live in the real world with its competing 
demands; requirements that we feed ourselves, and the like. If you show me someone who has deeply 
and truly studied each choice they have to make when voting, I will show you someone who is not all 
that busy.”). 
 259. See Rogers, supra note 18, at 4. 
 260. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 401. 
I - Schleicher_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:46 AM 
1096 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1043 
relationships to political parties are not primarily ideological or based on 
retrospective assessments of party performance.261 Rather, they have 
affective relationships with parties. These voters are members of parties 
first and their membership defines their ideology and positions on issues. 
Party affiliation is like a religion, not an expression of the sum of issue 
preferences. At the national level, this may not matter much; as long as 
there are a roughly equal number of non-responsive Democrats and 
Republicans, their voting patterns should wash out.262
All of these forces likely work together to ensure that voting for 
state legislature is more responsive to national politics than it is to 
anything state legislatures actually do. Notably, campaigns for a high-
profile office like governor or mayor can buck this trend, as candidates 
for these offices can develop their own brand in voters’ minds.
 But at the local 
level, if the rates of voters among Democrats and Republicans that are 
non-responsive to issues are equal, a big difference in national party 
membership can make local competition difficult. If a state is sixty percent 
Republican, and half of all voters are purely affective, in order to win a 
majority of the vote, a Democrat would need to win sixty percent of all 
voters who pay attention to state governmental performance, a tall order. 
263
Having state legislatures appoint senators likely made this worse, as 
it gave voters, including those conscious of the differences between state 
and national responsibility and state and national party stances, another 
reason to use their national preferences in state elections. Even if a voter 
is fully informed, she may just care more about the identity of a senator 
than the policies of the state government. But without state legislative 
appointment of senators, preferences about national politics—the 
popularity of the President and Congress—play the lead role in 
determining the results of state legislative elections. As a result, state 
legislative elections do not make state legislators accountable for their 
actions or responsive to the preferences of state voters on state issues. 
State democracy just does not work that well. 
 In fact 
we see competition in gubernatorial and mayoral races, even when we 
see no competition in the state legislatures and city councils in the same 
jurisdiction. But down-ballot races are defined by these dynamics. 
Further, state legislatures end up featuring the pathologies of national 
politics. Congress has, over the last three decades, become extremely 
polarized, both in terms of distinction between the parties and ideological 
distance between the preferences of each party’s median voter.264
 
 261. Id. at 363, 398. Again, this is not a problem about “some voters” but rather something that 
describes all of our behavior to some degree. Id. at 363. 
 While 
 262. Id. at 336. Or rather, if Democrats and Republicans are equally tribal. 
 263. Id. at 359–60. 
 264. See Abramowitz, supra note 207, at 140–44 (describing changes in polarization in Congress); 
McCarty et al., supra note 207, at 3. 
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there is a long debate about the causes of polarization, there are widely 
acknowledged costs and benefits. As E.E. Schattschneider and the 
“responsible party government” school of scholars argued in the 1950s, 
polarization makes voting decisions easier for voters, particularly low-
information ones, leading to stronger links between preferences and vote 
decisions, and allows majority parties to overcome institutional and 
constitutional roadblocks to policymaking during periods of one-party 
governance.265 On the other hand, polarization means that during periods 
of one-party governance, policies may be far from the preferences of the 
median voter, executive power may be largely unchecked, changes in 
power may result in wild swings in policy, and agreement between parties 
may be more difficult when control of the presidency and at least one 
branch of Congress is split.266
As Congress has polarized, state legislatures generally have as well, 
although there is substantial variation among them. More than half of 
state legislatures are more polarized than Congress, and polarization is 




 265. See generally Austin Ranney, Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System: A 
Commentary, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 488 (1951); E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (1942). 
For a discussion of the responsible party government school and of the benefits of polarization for 
voters, see Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 373–74, 382–83. For a recent paper in this vein, 
see generally David R. Jones, Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House 
Elections, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 323 (2010) (stating that polarization increases the degree to which 
majority party incumbents are held accountable for voter dislike of Congress). 
 But state legislatures 
face very different institutional problems than Congress. States generally 
lack (or have to a lesser degree) many of the institutional burdens that 
polarized federal parties help overcome, like strongly entrenched 
bureaucracies, legislative rules like the filibuster, and fixed constitutional 
impediments. Further, as discussed above, there is little reason to believe 
that clearer choices between state legislative parties matter very much to 
voters. The result is that state legislatures can suffer the pathologies of 
polarization—non-median voter policy results in periods of one-party 
 266. For summaries and discussions of the costs of polarization to the federal government, see 
generally Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 273 (2011); Nicol C. Rae, Be Careful What You Wish For: 
The Rise of Responsible Parties in American National Politics, 10 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 169 (2007). 
 267. See Boris Shor, Polarization Trends in American State Legislatures by Chamber, Measuring 
Am. Legislatures (July 26, 2013), http://americanlegislatures.com/2013/07/26/polarization-trends-in-
american-state-legislatures-by-chamber; Boris Shor, State Legislatures and Polarization, Measuring 
Am. Legislatures (May 21, 2013), http://americanlegislatures.com/2013/05/21/state-legislatures-and-
polarization; Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, Ideological Mapping of American State Legislature, 
105 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 530, 540 (2011). A large percentage (although not all) of the less-polarized state 
legislatures are extremely uncompetitive, with the ten least polarized including states like New Jersey 
(where control over a house of the legislature last occurred in 1969), Hawaii (1963), and Massachusetts 
(1958). The ten least polarized legislatures are in order Louisiana, Rhode Island, Nebraska (which has 
non-partisan elections but has factions that are increasing in polarization), West Virginia, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New Jersey. Michael J. Dubin, Party 
Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary 1796–2006 (2007). 
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control, wild swings when power changes hands, and extreme lockups 
during periods of mixed control—without any of the corresponding 
benefits. The form taken by national political parties is a response to the 
needs and demands of national politics, but their structure extends into 
the states to the detriment of state politics. 
The failure of the Seventeenth Amendment to make state democracy 
work substantially better suggests that reformers were using the wrong 
tools. We see the phenomenon of second-order elections under a whole 
variety of different institutional structures, from U.S. states to big cities to 
European Parliament elections. When reformers attempt to change this 
dynamic, as they frequently do, they usually focus on formal ties between 
the levels of government, or the powers allocated to each. The European 
Union, for instance, has repeatedly increased the power of the European 
Parliament in the faint hope that at some point it will become powerful 
enough that voters pay attention to what it does.268
An alternative would be to focus on the mechanics of elections. 
Elections are not pure representations of voter choice, but are rather 
structured by laws to achieve certain purposes.
 Faced with a problem 
of how elections work, the proposed solutions are constitutional in form. 
269 If reformers want state 
elections to serve the purpose of making state officials accountable for 
their performance, they would need to design election laws that provide 
voters with information and structure voter choices in ways aimed at that 
end. One can imagine all sorts of changes, ranging from the quotidian—
like labeling which party holds a majority of the seats in the state 
legislature on the ballot—to the major, like barring national parties from 
contesting state elections, allowing state specific parties to rise up and 
contest these elections.270
Rather than changing the constitutional structure, we need to look at 
how we regulate state elections. By doing this, we might be able to fulfill 
the Seventeenth Amendment’s promise and make state democracy work. 
 But the focus should be on developing election 
rules that shape party competition to produce outcomes that fit the goal 
inherent in holding the election in the first place. We hold state 
legislative elections, presumably, in order to get feedback from state 
voters on state governmental performance. Our election law rules do not 
ensure that state elections serve this purpose. 
 
 268. See Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19, at 110–15. 
 269. Paul Edelman illustrates this point nicely by showing that voting for Best Picture in the 
Oscars is unexplainable were the only goal to represent voters’ preferences, but that the voting system 
exists to achieve other ends (in this case, ratings for the Oscar’s broadcast.) See generally Paul H. 
Edelman, The Institutional Dimension of Election Design (Vanderbilt Public Law, Research Paper 
No. 11-18, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819306. 
 270. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 50–72 (imagining all sorts of changes, including 
ones of dubious constitutionality like the one discussed above). 
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Conclusion 
This Article has shown that one of the animating reasons for the 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment was a desire to remove 
consideration of national politics from state legislative elections. It has 
also shown that it did not succeed in doing so. Our challenge is to 
consider both how this goal might be achieved and how failure to do so—
either because reforms are unsuccessful or not attempted—should 
change our expectations and understandings of federalism. 
